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The Role of Statutory Regulation
of Public Service Ethics in Great
Britain and the United States
By ROBERT G. VAUGHN*
B.A., 1966, J.D., 1969, Universiy of Oklahoma; LL.M., 1970, Harvard
University; Professor of Law, The American University
During the 1970's scandals in the public service troubled both
the United States and Great Britain. In the United States concerns
arising from Watergate and dissatisfaction with the regulatory pro-
cess culminated in greater regulation of the public service through
federal legislation such as the Ethics in Government Act of 19781
and the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978' and in attempts to re-
form the procurement practices of state and local government.3
Concern in Great Britain arose from a widely publicized series
of scandals involving a number of local government councillors,
employees, contractors and architects and a senior official of the
civil service. These scandals, known popularly as the "Poulson af-
fairs," stimulated two public inquiries into public service ethics in
Great Britain. The first of these, the Prime Minister's Committee
on Local Government Rules of Conduct (known as the Redcliffe-
Maud Report after its chairman) was reported in May 19744 and
* This article is based upon research completed while the author was Scholar-in-Resi-
dence, 1979-1980, at King's College, London. The author thanks F.J.C. Amos, Senior Fellow,
Institute of Local Government Studies, University of Birmingham, and Ms. Judy Mahew,
Lecturer in Law, King's College, London, for reading and commenting upon portions of the
manuscript.
This article limits discussion to England and Wales because a different legal system
exists in Scotland. Also, the article does not consider government owned corporations, the
National Health Service or nationalized industries. Parallels to these bodies in the United
States are difficult to draw and concern in Britain has not focused upon them.
1. Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 5, 18, 28, 39
U.S.C.). See generally R. VAUGHN, CONFLICT OF INTEREST REGULATION IN THE FEDERAL ExEc-
UTvE BRANCH (1979).
2. Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). See
generally R. VAUGHN, supra note 1.
3. American Bar Association, Model Procurement Code (Approved House of Delegates,
February 13, 1979). Article 12 concerns Ethics in Public Contracting.
4. REPORT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S COMMITTEE ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT RULES OF CON-
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the second, The Royal Commission of Standards of Conduct in
Public Life (known as the Salmon Report after its chairman) was
reported in July 1976.1
The British public service, particularly the central civil ser-
vice, enjoys a reputation for great probity and integrity.6 The
"Poulson affair," which involved the bribery and graft of a sub-
stantial number of local government officials, touched the civil ser-
vice.7 Discovery of the scandals came not through official channels
but through the press and through the combined fortuities of Mr.
Poulson's bankruptcy and the detailed recordkeeping of his own
dealings.
The "Poulson affair" caused public anxiety and "widespread
current disquiet about conduct in local government"' because of its
geographical spread and because of the involvement of a number
of prominent public servants." Accordingly, the scandals raised
questions regarding the extent of corruption in British public life.
Both the Redcliffe-Maud and the Salmon Reports concluded
that corruption was not widespread. The Redcliffe-Maud Report
concluded "that standards of conduct in local government are gen-
erally high" 10 while the Salmon Reported stated:
DUCT, CMND. No. 5636 (1974) [hereinafter cited as the REDCLIc -MAUD REPORT].
5. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON STANDARDS OF CoNDUCT IN PUBLIC LIFE, CmND.
No. 6524 (1976) [hereinafter cited as SALMON REPORT].
6. See G. BENSON, POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN AMERICA 3 (1977); E. GLADDEN, CIVIL SER-
VICES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1855-1970, at 147 (1967); Roberts, Conduct in Local Govern-
ment: Situating The Redcliffe-Maud Report, 18 PUB. AD. BULL. 39, 40 (1975); Tickner, Eth-
ical Guidelines for Administrators: Comparison with Whitehall, 34 PU. AD. REv. 587, 592
(1974); Robinton, The British Method of Dealing with Political Corruption in Political
Corruption, in READINGS IN CoMPARATIvE ANALYSIS 249, 254 (A. Heidenheimer ed. 1970). As
one author noted in discussing earlier post-war scandal involving graft- "To an American
who is merely familiar with the newspaper accounts of investigations into the affairs of cor-
rupt American public officials and some of the criminal trials that have followed, it seems
surprising that so much excitement was aroused in England about so little." Robinton,
supra, at 254.
7. A summary of the "Poulson affair" may be found in SALMON REPORT, supra note 5,
paras. 11-24. A more complete analysis of the affair may be found through examination of
evidence submitted by the Director of Public Prosecutions in RECORDS OF EVIDENCE OF THE
ROYAL COMMISSION ON STANDARDS OF CONDUCT IN PUBLIC LIE (available at the Public
Records Office in Kew, England (ref. no. H.O. 241/35)). The civil servant convicted in the
"Poulson affair" was an under-secretary of the Scottish Office. In 1972, the Secretary of
State for the Home Office, one of the government's most important ministers, resigned after
his name was mentioned with the group of companies established by Poulson. E. WADE AND
G. PHILLIPS, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 107 (9th ed. 1977).
8. REDCLIFFE-MAUDE REPORT, supra note 4,'at vii.
9. SALMON REPORT, supra note 5, para. 11.
10. REDCLIFFE-MAUD REPORT, suprd note 4, para. 15.
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We have heard no evidence to give us concern about the integrity
and sense of public duty of our bureaucracy as a whole, or to sug-
gest that it is common for members of the public to offer bribes
to officials of any rank as an inducement to grant a favour or to
expedite claims or applications in the day-to-day administration
of central and local government, or for officials to solicit bribes.11
These conclusions colored the recommendations of both re-
ports. Due to the perception that corruption was not widespread,
neither report suggested radical changes. The recommendations
that were made simply tightened and modified existing controls.12
For example, the Salmon Report specifically rejected a suggestion
to create an independent body to investigate corruption in local
government.13 Thus, the response in Great Britain to the scandals
led not to significantly greater legal regulation but to continued
reliance upon an existing system of controls, a substantial portion
of which rested on informal sanctions.
Many commentators did not share the confidence expressed in
the reports that corruption was not widespread. 4 The Royal Com-
mission was critized for underestimating the problem, 5 and for
suffering from the limitations characterizing all Royal Commis-
sions as investigative bodies," specifically that the Royal Commis-
sion Report owas based on inadequate research. 17 According to one
British economist, corruption is an exchange by a public servant of
11. SALMON REPORT, supra note 5, para. 35.
12. REDCLiPFE-MAUD REPORT, supra note 4, at vii, xii (Summary and Recommenda-
tions); SALMON REPORT, supra note 5, at 101-109 (Summary of Recommendations).
13. SALMON REPORT, supra note 5, paras. 272-78.
14. The Redcliffe-Maud Report was criticized for its undue optimism in believing that
existing mechanisms could control corruption. Hare, The Need for New Anti-Corruption
Laws in Local Government, 1974 PUBLIC LAW 146, 150. Furthermore, since corruption is by
its nature a secret crime, the extent of corruption is difficult to determine. Regan and Mor-
ris, Local Government Corruption and Public Confidence, 1969 PUBLIC LAw 132, 138.
15. Pinto-Duschinsky, Corruption in Britain: The Royal Commission on Standards of
Conduct in Public Life, 25 POL. STUD. 274, 275 (1977).
16. Id. at 280 (The suggested limitations are that the frame of reference is vague, the
Commission operates only part-time, a high proportion of those offering evidence are repre-
sentatives of official organizations and bodies, Commissions have no real power to compel
evidence, and private citizens are reluctant to participate). The written evidence of the
Royal Commission contains criticism that certain groups were not allowed to present oral
evidence to the Commission. Evidence submitted by the Local Government Reform Society
in RECORDS OF EVIDENCE OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON STANDARDS OF CONDUCT IN PUBLIC
LIn (available in the Public Records Office, Kew, England (ref. no. H.O. 241/49)) [hereinaf-
ter cited as RECORDS OF EVIDENCE].
17. Roberts, The Royal Commission on Standards of Conduct in Public Life 1974-
1976: Recommendations and Omissions, 23 PUB. AD. BULL. 54, 58 (1977).
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influence over the provision of scarce resources for monetary or
other award and that the increased discretionary power of public
servants over the competitive market increases the likelihood of
corruption. "Corruption may be more widespread than the powers-
that-be care to admit.'"18 Still conflict of interest problems in the
British public service seem less severe than in the United States
public service, explaining in part why there is no statute to regu-
late conflict of interest in the British public service. 9 Indeed, little
statutory control of any character applies to the civil service.20
Regulation of ethics in the British public service rests upon admin-
istrative provisions.
Discussion of the two areas of controversy in Britain, post-
employment limitations and protection of whistleblowers, explores
the need for statutory regulation and examines the conventions
and practices of the British public service that emphasize non-
statutory control.
This article discusses limitations placed on post-employment
activities of public servants and whistleblower protection in the
civil service2 1 and in local government.22 The article compares and
18. Shackelton, Corruption: An Essay in Economic Analysis, 49 POL. QuAR. 25, 34
(1978).
19. Local government officers are required to disclose certain pecuniary interests that
they have in contractual matters coming before a local government. Local Government Act,
1972, ch. 70, § 117(1). Elected members of local governments are subject to more extensive
disclosure requirements. Local Government Act, 1972 ch. 70, §§ 94-96. Local government
employees are also subject to the Prevention of Corruption Act, note 20 infra.
20. Only one criminal statute, the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, ch. 34,
affects civil servants, although the Official Secrets Acts concern the ability of civil servants
to disclose or to publish official information. See discussion, notes 148-156 infra. An analysis
of the Prevention of Corruption Act and amendments made to it in 1916 is found in SALMON
REPORT, supra note 5, pares. 43-87.
21. The civil service, including the diplomatic service, consists of 733,176 full-time posi-
tions. CIVIL SERVICE DEP'T, CIvIL SERVICE STATISTICS 1979 at 3-4. (Dispute continues, how-
ever, regarding the definition of the Civil Service. The Civil Service, in GOVERNMENT OBSER-
VATIONS ON THE ELEVENTH REPORT FROM THE EXPENDITURE COMMITTEE, 27 CMND. No. 7117,
at 27 (1978) [hereinafter cited as GOV'T OBSERVATIONS]). Of these, 566,000 are non-industrial
staff. CIVIL SERVICE STATISTICS 1979, supra, at 16-17. The non-industrial home civil service
consists of four general categories and a number of specialized categories. The four general
categories are the open structure, executive directing grades, general category, and the secre-
tarial category. The open structure contains permanent secretaries, deputy secretaries, and
under secretaries, the highest ranking administrative group. The executive directing grades
contain the next level of executive officers. The general category contains the administration
group consisting of assistant secretaries, senior principals, principals and grades of executive
officers, administrative trainees, and clerical officers. Also within this category are econo-
mists, information officers, librarians, and statisticians. The fourth category is a secretarial
one. In addition there are specialized categories for professional groups such as scientists,
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contrasts the United States and British practices in each of these
data processors, and lawyers.
22. Local government in Britain is a creature of statute. REFERENCE DIVISION, CENTRAL
OFFICE OF INFORMATION, BRITAIN 1979: AN OFFICIAL HANDBOOK 63 (1978). Local authorities
may only carry out functions that are assigned by statute, but the statutes do allow local
authorities considerable latitude. Local government has, however, in the last fifteen years
acquired considerable power and disposes of a good portion of all public spending.
The Local Government Act of 1972 establishes in England and Wales basically four
types of local authorities: metropolitan county councils, non-metropolitan country councils,
metropolitan district councils, and non-metropolitan district councils. Non-metropolitan
county councils are primarily responsible for services such as planning, highways, education,
police, and fire services and other large scale local government services, while metroplitan
county councils have similar but somewhat different functions tailored to the services
needed by large concentrations of population. Non-metropolitan district councils are prima-
rily responsible for such items as planning applications, airports, and housing, while metro-
politan district councils have similar but somewhat different functions tailored to the ser-
vices needed by large concentrations of population. In addition, the Greater London Council
created in 1963 acts as a type of regional authority with the chartered London Boroughs.
The policies of each local authority are determined by an elected council and are ad-
ministered by local authority employees. Councillors are elected by party affiliation and
party politics play an increasingly important role in local government. Administration is
divided into professional areas such as solicitors, treasurers, engineers, surveyors, etc. and is
headed, depending on the size of the authority, by a chief executive or other administrative
official.
While local authorities have broad powers, a large number of controls by central gov-
ernment cover the activities of local authorities. The Department of the Environment exer-
cises considerable control over local government including the review of requests for dispen-
sations from local councillors who have declared a pecuniary interest in a matter pending
before a local council.
Approximately 400 local authorities, metropolitan, district, and county, exist in Eng-
land and Wales. BRITAIN 1979: AN OFFICIAL HANDBOOK, supra at 61. Each authority issues
standing orders often patterned after uniform standing orders issued by the Department of
the Environment but tailored to local conditions. Local conditions vary widely including the
wealth of a council, its party composition and the occupations and class of persons elected
to the council. No centralized depository of these standing orders exists and any study of
local conditions and practices requires a visit to the local authority.
The seven local authorities (Greater London Council, Kent County Council, Luton Bor-
ough Council, Mid-Glamorgan County Council, Plymouth City Council, City of Wakefield
Metropolitan District Council, London Borough of Westminster) whose practices, rules, and
regulations are examined in this Article cannot represent completely the large number of
local authorities in England and Wales. The authorities studied, however, are located in
different parts of the country, are of different size and wealth, and are controlled by differ-
ent political parties. These authorities, while not a representative sample, are illustrative of
the similarities and differences in ethical problems and controls encountered by local
authorities.
Local authority practices were examined by reviewing local regulations and through in-
terviews of the following local authority officers: Interview with W. U. Jackson, Chief Execu-
tive, and W. G. Hopkin, County Clerk, Kent County Council, in Maidstone, England (Feb.
12, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Jackson-Hopkin Interview]; Interview with K.F. Pettifer, As-
sistant Chief Executive, London, Borough of Westminister, in London, England (Feb. 26,
1980) [hereinafter cited as Pettifer Interview]; Interview with T. V. Walters, Chief Execu-
tive, and W. P. Davies, Mid-Glamorgan County Council, in Cardiff, Wales (Feb. 27, 1980)
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two areas and suggests some general implications of the British ex-
perience for statutory regulation in the United States.
Two areas of controversy, (1) post-employment limitations
and (2) whistleblowing, provide insights into the ethics of the Brit-
ish public service. They also expose attributes of the public service
which are important in examining the role of law in the establish-
ment and preservation of public service ethics. While substantial
controversy surrounds post-employment limitations, whistleblow-
ing does not receive the same public attention. Nonetheless, an ex-
amination of whistleblowing reaches deeply into the assumptions
underlying the conventions of conduct in the British civil service.
I. POST-EMPLOYMENT LIMITATIONS
A. The British Model
1. The Civil Service
No contemporary question of public service ethics in Britain
creates more controversy than the acceptance of business appoint-
ments by retiring or resigning civil servants. The controversy has
many similarities to the post-employment limitations controversy
in the United States, but significant and important differences
remain.
Argument for more extensive post-employment limitations in
the federal civil service in the United States focuses upon the
movement of substantial numbers of individuals between business
and government.2 5 Particular attention centers on the effects of
this interchange of personnel on the regulatory process.24 In a way,
[hereinafter cited as Walters-Davies Interview]; Interview with J. G. Standbury, Chief Exec-
utive, and L. A. Tawn, Secretary, City of Wakefield Metropolitan Council, in Wakefield,
England (Mar. 6, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Standbury-Tawn Interview]; Interview with A.
Collins, Chief Executive, Luton Borough Council, in Luton, England (Mar. 26, 1980) [here-
inafter cited as Collins Interview]; Interview with J. Cooper, Director of Administration,
Greater London Council, in London, England (Apr. 23, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Cooper
Interview]; Interview with R. A. Taylor, Assistant Town Clerk, Plymouth City Council, in
Plymouth, England (May 13, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Taylor Interview].
In addition to the officers of local authorities with whom I spoke, I thank the following
people for their advice and assistance: J. E. Bell, Under Secetary, Professional Division, The
Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy; H. W. Benoy, Under Secretary,
Association of District Councils; G. Daniels, the representative of The Chartered Institute of
Public Finance and Accountancy Bodies; W. D. Partridge, Under Secretary, Association of
County Councils; and L. A. Plowman, Under Secretary, Association of Metrpolitan Councils.
23. R. VAUGHN, supra note 1, at 79-97.
24. Id. at 119-22.
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extensive post-employment limitations in the United States are a
result of personnel flexibility at the top of government service that
necessarily implies the movement of persons in and out of
government.
The British civil service, unlike that of the United States, is
relatively stable. A change in government results in a change in
ministers, but in the change of few other positions. Few, if any,
changes occur in top administrative positions. Significant numbers
of outsiders do not enter the service at high levels.25 Therefore, the
British civil service avoids conditions that create much of the pres-
sure for post-employment restrictions within the United States.
The very stability, however, of the British civil service and the
absence of substantial numbers of non-career persons in high ad-
ministrative positions generate criticism. The 1968 Report of the
Royal Commission on the Civil Service urged that "both in the
public interest and also for the health of the Service itself, effective
steps must be taken to ensure a very much larger and freer flow of
men and women between the Service and outside employment
than there has been in the past."'26 The Royal Commission recom-
mended that, among other things, determined efforts be made to
bring about the temporary interchange of civil servants with pri-
vate industry and commerce on a much larger scale.27
The subsequent modest interchange program" highlights both
the stability of the British civil service and the risks of such a pro-
gram. The British interchange program seems to have avoided the
scandals of a similar program in the United States.29 Still, the ac-
cess to confidential information can be a problem and such infor-
mation may include particular knowledge about the policies and
25. See generally Sheriff, Outsiders in a Closed Career: The Example of the British
Civil Service, 50 PuB. AD. 397 (1972) wherein the author discusses the modest programs
available for mid-level entry of "outsiders."
26. 1 REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE CIVIL SERVICE, CMNm. No. 3638, para.
123 (1968) [hereinafter cited as the Civim SERVICE REPORT].
27. Id. para. 128. The Report also recommended exchange with local government and
with nationalized industry but such exchanges have been a small part of the program.
28. The program established in 1978 an overall target of 200 exchanges by 1980. While
some previous years had failed to indicate that the goal would be met, good progress toward
the goal was made. CIVII, SERVICE DEP'T, INTERCHANGE OF STAFF BETWEEN THE HOME Civiw
SERVICE AND INDusTRY: REPORT FOR 1978, para. 10 [hereinafter referred to as 1978 IN-
TERCHANGE REPORT]. Recent cutbacks in funding for the civil service may make the goal
difficult to reach. Interview with J. W. Evans, Civil Service Dep't, in London, England
(April 16, 1980).
29. SuBcoMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT OF THE HousE COMMITEE ON SMALL
BUsINEss, THE PRESIDENTIAL ExEcurvE INTERCHANGE PROGRAM, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
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operations of an office.80 The Civil Service Department cautions
departments to consider the propriety of interchanges and "the
need to guard against the reality or appearance of conflict of
interest."81
Additional risks arise when a industry wishes to supplement
the civil service contribution in cases where the industry is "anx-
ious to set up the secondment.' ' 32 While the Civil Service does not
object to such an arrangement, departments are asked to notify the
Civil Service of any special arrangements and cautioned to avoid
providing ground for criticism.33
While the interchange program helps to demonstrate the small
number of persons brought into the civil service from business, a
number of civil servants leave the service either through retire-
ment or resignation. Some of those who retire or resign secure em-
ployment with other organizations, including business and com-
mercial organizations."
Given the structure of the British civil service, one familiar
with the motivations of extensive post-employment limitations in
the United States might posit that public concern with post-em-
ployment limitations in the British civil service would be small.
Public concern, however, is substantial. A description of the nature
of the controversy in Britain suggests the reasons and presents the
arguments for the use of statutes to control this area of public ser-
vice ethics.
30. Stewart, Communications Between the Civil Service and Industry at 9 in CIVIL
SERVICE COLLEGE LECTURE 14 (1975) (where the lecturer warns that a person in your office
"may learn things about you that you did not really want him to know"); 1978 INTERCHANGE
REPORT, supra note 28, at para. 43.
31. Civil Service Department, General Notice 79/46 para. 24 (July 23, 1979), reprinted
in WHITLEY BULL., Sept./Oct. 1979, at 146, 148.
32. Id., para. 18.
33. Id.
34. TREASURY AND CIVIL SERVICE COMMITTEE ON EFFICIENCY OF THE CIVIL SERVICE, MIN-
UTES OF EVIDENCE, Monday, January 28, 1980 (1980) (hereinafter referred to as MmUTES OF
EVIDENCE]. In that portion of the Administrative Group, including many of the principle
administrative positions, approximately 2,450 persons voluntarily left the civil service in
1978. CVnL SERVICE STATSTICS 1979, supra note 21, at 47. Some 19,000 persons left the non-
industrial civil service for all grades in 1978. Id. at 57. In that portion of the Administrative
Group including permanent secretaries, deputy and under secretaries, a total of 632 persons
left the service from 1973 to 1979, and of these, 73, or 11%, applied to take business ap-
pointments after leaving. MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, supra, at Annex 5.
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a. Rules Regarding Acceptance of Business Appointments
The Civil Service Pay and Conditions of Service Code requires
all civil servants of the rank of under secretary or above to obtain
government permission before accepting within a two-year period
of resignation or retirement offer of employment from organiza-
tions falling within certain categories. These organizations include
ones which have a contractual or other special relationship with
the government or receive loan guarantees or other forms of capital
assistance from the government. Organizations in which the gov-
ernment holds shares and semi-public organizations created by the
government or by parliament are also included.3 5
The Establishment Officers' Guide suggests a number of fac-
tors to be considered in the government's decision as to whether
assent should be granted.3 6 The degree of contact between the civil
servant and the prospective employee is a principle factor and nor-
mally some personal involvement by the civil servant is required.
The Guide cautions, however, that "[s]ometimes the prospective
employer's relations with the Government may be relevant irre-
spective of any involvement on the part of the individual con-
cerned.'37 Personal involvement is assumed if the civil servant or
those for whom he is responsible "at any time within the course of
his official duties during the two years before his resignation or
retirement or earlier if the association has been of a continued or
reported nature" have been involved in certain enumerated
activities.38
Requests to join a firm may be approved, disapproved or ap-
proved with conditions.3 The conditions may include imposition of
a waiting period of up to two years; permanent secretaries must
automatically wait three months, and these three months, are con-
sidered part of any longer period imposed. Upon taking the posi-
tion, a civil servant may be prohibited for a period up to two years
35. CIviL SERVICE PAY & CONDITIONS OF SERVICE CODE para. 9961 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as PAY & CONDITIONS CODE].
36. ESTABLISHMENT OFFICERS' GUIDE para. 4250 (1977).
37. Id.
38. Id. A number of the enumerated activities relate to contractual obligations and in-
clude those activities dealing with the receipt of offers or the award of contracts between the
prospective employer and the government, and the administration or monitoring of con-
tracts after they have been awarded. Non-contractual arrangements with the firm fall also
within the activities, if the firm operates in a field where the Government or the civil ser-
vant's department has financial, policy, or other special interests.
39. Id. para. 4244.
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from becoming involved in dealings between the prospective em-
ployer and the government on all or upon stated issues. In addi-
tion, the civil servant may be prohibited from becoming involved
in dealings between the prospective employer and named competi-
tors and a civil servant may be required to seek the approval of the
prospective employer's competitors.
Procedures for considering applications vary somewhat de-
pending upon the rank of the civil servant. As a general rule, the
higher the rank, the more elaborate the procedures for review.
When permanent and second permanent secretaries are involved,
the Head of the Civil Service and the minister of the appropriate
department may approve a non-commercial appointment, such as
that to a university.40 In all other cases, decisions are made by the
Prime Minister after referral of the matter to an advisory commit-
tee which consists of three members "having experience and rela-
tions between the Civil Service and the public or private sectors of
industry."4' The Head of the Civil Service and the minister of the
department involved may approve requests (with conditions if nec-
essary) for all heads of departments and deputy secretaries without
referral to the advisory committee. 42 Applications by under secre-
taries may be approved by the department involved without refer-
ral to the advisory committee.43
The Code of Conduct allows departments to require assent for
positions below under secretary that are of a special or technical
nature. In these cases, the Civil Service Department must be con-
sulted if the civil servant has had any of the types of contacts that
would be assumed to be personal contacts for under secretaries
and above.44 For the rank of Senior Executive Officer and below,
the Civil Service Department need not be consulted if the civil ser-
vant's contacts with the future employer have been casual and it
seems unlikely that the appointment will be criticized because the
civil servant is not in the position to take trade secrets of competi-
40. Id.
41. SALMON REPORT, supra note 5, app. 15 at para. 10. The present advisory committee
has five members and a chairman, Lord Diamond. The members include a former secretary
of the cabinet, a former secretary of State for Scotland, a former second permanent secre-
tary of the Department of Health and Social Security, a former member of the Royal Com-
mission on Standards of Conduct in Public Life, and a former chief of the Defence Staff.
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 34, at 304.
42. ESTABLISHMENT OFFICERS' GUIDE, supra note 36, paras. 4228, 4232.
43. Id. para. 4236.
44. Id.
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tors to the prospective employer.4 5
Since these regulations are administrative and apply to em-
ployees who are leaving the civil service, sanctions for their breach
are limited. The lack of sanctions and the questions raised by the
movement of senior civil servants into business and commercial or-
ganizations make post employment limitations the single most con-
troversial issue regarding the Code. The issues raised by this con-
troversy help to expose the character of control of public service
ethics and are treated separately.46
Departments may require that the occupants of certain posi-
tions of a special or technical nature obtain the assent of the gov-
ernment before undertaking certain employment after resignation
or retirement.47 The Department of the Environment requires ap-
plication for assent from a broad category of grades. 48 The Depart-
ment requires application from such a wide range of persons be-
cause "in the Department the range of technical information is so
widely dispersed at all levels, and as consideration about trade
secrets may apply to firms with whom the Department has no di-
rect relations.149
The government modified the rules regarding the acceptance
of business appointments and created the present civil service
rules,50 which were approved by the Royal Commission on Stan-
dards of Conduct in Public Life, and acclaimed as a welcome force
in maintaining public confidence.5 Despite the approval of the
Royal Commission, disquiet arose regarding the acceptance of bus-
iness appointments by senior civil servants. Although the number
of such cases is small, the persons involved were well-known and
influential;52 accordingly, their acceptance of business appoint-
ments drew comment.5" Some comment also concerned less senior
45. Id. para. 4237.
46. See text accompanying notes 50-119, infra.
47. ESTABLISHMENT OFFICERS' GUIDE, supra note 36, para. 4219.
48. DEP'T OF ENVIRONMENT, STAFF HANDBOOK § 108.24 (1975). Included are all princi-
pals, principal professional and technology officers, principal scientific officers, and all senior
executive officers in the contracts directorate and in PSA supplies.
49. Id. § 108.23.
50. SALMON REPORT, supra note 5, para. 200. A minor modification was made in 1980.
51. Id. para. 209.
52. The cases arousing interest involved the highest ranking career servants, permanent
secretaries, assistant and deputy secretaries. 873 HANSARD'S PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, May
6, 1974, col. 22.
53. Jordan and Richardson, Pantouflage: A Civil Service Perk, NEW SocmTv Feb. 22,
1979, at 415-16 contains a listing of a number of these high-ranking civil servants; P. KELL-
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officials, particularly those involved in the Ministry of Defense. 4
The Eleventh Report of the House of Commons Expenditure
Committee concerning the Civil Service suggested pay recommen-
dations that "should reduce the number of high civil servants seek-
ing jobs in private industry .... -5 Noting public criticism that
implied future employment could be used to influence civil ser-
vants, the committee suggested that a sanction be provided
through a contractual provision or by legislation that would penal-
ize the companies that appointed former civil servants without the
permission of the government."
The government responded by noting the difficulty with the
Committee's recommendations and by promising to watch how the
existing rules changed in 1975 were working.5 7 The Committee was
not satisfied by this response, considering "that this is a matter of
principle upon which the Government should take further
action."58
The parliament formed after the election of a conservative
government created a new group of select committees, including a
Select Committee on the Treasury and the Civil Service. That
committee conducted hearings on the question of civil servants ac-
cepting business appointments. In late 1979, the Secretary of the
Cabinet, a senior civil servant holding one of the most influential
posts in government, retired and accepted an appointment to the
Chairmanship of the London subsidiary of the Banque Nationale
de Paris, the nationalized French bank. These actions created pub-
lic comment and further scrutiny of the Select Committee.5 9
It is only possible to speculate on the reasons for the wide-
spread nature of controversy surrounding these appointments.
First, the increased involvement of civil servants in private activi-
ties makes their experience and influence increasingly valuable to
NER AND N. CROWTHER-HUNT, THE CIVIL SERVANTS 195-96 (1980) lists the subsequent ap-
pointments of all permanent secretaries leaving government service from 1974-77; B. SEDG-
EMORE, THE SECRET CONSTITUTION 160-61 (1980) lists the applications of under secretaries
and above, from 1974-77.
54. Pinto-Duschinksy, supra note 15, at 278-79.
55. 1 ELEVENTH REPORT FROM THE EXPENDITURE COMMITTEE, THE CIVIL SERVICE para. 42
(1976-1977) [hereinafter cited as ELEVENTH REPORT].
56. Id.
57. GOV'T OBSERVATIONS, supra note 21, paras. 29-32.
58. TWELFTH REPORT FROM THE EXPENDITURE COMMITTEE, RESPONSE TO THE GOVERN-
MENT'S OBSERVATIONS ON THE COMMITTEE'S REPORT ON THE CIVIL SERVICE para. 7 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as TWELFTH REPORT].
59. Manchester Guardian, Feb. 4, 1980, at 4, col. 7.
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business and commercial organizations. Second, greater govern-
mental authority increases the public's awareness of the power of
the bureaucracy, and leads to proposals to control and limit the
influence of the bureaucracy.60 Third, media attacks on the civil
service and the decline in the image of the service have rendered it
more susceptible to criticism. 1 Finally, the appointments upon
which attention has been focused have involved persons of im-
mense influence and power. Concern may rest not upon a simplis-
tic attention to the notable but upon a sophisticated understand-
ing of the character of conflict of interest problems involved when
the highest ranking civil servants retire or resign to accept ap-
pointments with businesses or other groups that have official deal-
ings with the department in which the civil servant was employed.
An examination of the issues raised by the controversy in Britain
tests the legitimacy of the concern.
b. Criticism of the Rules
Criticism focuses upon the enforcement of the existing rules
and upon the content of the rules itself. Suggestions from parlia-
mentary committees have proposed modifications in the enforce-
ment of the rules and in the content of post-employment
limitation.
Enforcement of the rules naturally receives attention because
the content of the rules embracing a large number of positions is
broad. Therefore, the resolution of individual cases and the effec-
tiveness of the rules become critical.
The overwhelming majority of the applications for business
appointments are approved.62 While there are insufficient statistics
to show that enforcement of the existing rules is inadequate, the
inference can be drawn that since so few applications are denied,
the enforcement process screens very few cases and allows many
60. See generally G. FRY, THE GRowTH OF GOVERNMENT- THE DEVELOPMENT OF IDEAS
ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE STATE AND MACHINERY AND FUNCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT IN BRITAIN
SINCE 1780, at 232-33 (1979).
61. Nagler, The Image of the Civil Service in Britain, 57 PUB. AD. 127, 128 (1979) (the
author discusses the declining image of the British civil service and argues that its compe-
tency and integrity ought at least to be recognized. Id. at 129).
62. Of 405 applications made by assistant secretaries and higher ranking personnel be-
tween 1973 and 1979, only 8 were disapproved and conditions were imposed in 57 of the
applications approved. MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 34, at Annex 4. Up to December
1979, only 4 of the 177 applications considered by the Advisory Committee were rejected.
Id. No statistics are available for civil servants below the rank of assistant secretary.
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appointments to continue although conflicts exist. Although this is
a permissible inference, only an examination of the individual
cases would provide the information necessary to determine the
character of these conflicts. Other inferences are possible as well.
The sample of applications could be biased because those persons
who truly have significant conflicts assess their chances and do not
even seek consent. Even if this latter inference were accepted, then
it is unclear whether these persons decline appointments or simply
accept them without seeking permission.6
The Expenditure Committee's concern that the rules carried
no legal sanction suggests that persons simply might not apply,
particularly if, as the argument above assumes, they believed that
their application would be rejected. The Report of the Royal Com-
mission on Standards of Conduct in Public Life suggested this un-
written sanction behind the civil service rules. "No business organ-
ization would lightly contemplate the appointment of an ex-civil
servant against the Government's instructions, and so risk incur-
ring the Government's disapproval."' 4
Moreover, the Royal Commission's language indicates that the
lack of a specific government disapproval may persuade an em-
ployee with a difficult case to avoid seeking approval. Lacking a
specific government disapproval, the government must show that
the company knew that the employee did not have the required
certificate of approval before it can be subject to any sanction, for-
mal or otherwise. The first judgment is one requiring some appre-
ciation of the operation of the rules and the second would require a
specific inquiry of the prospective employee. Since the hiring of a
former senior civil servant should suggest some inquiry regarding
compliance with the civil service rules, placing the burden on the
company might be appropriate.
As suggested by the Royal Commissson, the application of the
informal sanction in the form of governmental disapproval of busi-
ness employers also poses difficulties. The first is practical; the sec-
ond, ironically, is ethical. As a practical matter, the government
may find it difficult to apply the informal sanction for it would
require notification of a breach and coordination between govern-
ment departments.
Although the British civil service is noted for contact and con-
63. The Civil Service Department has no evidence to suggest that civil servants have
taken up business appointments without seeking the government's assent. Id., para. 6.
64. SALMON REPORT, supra note 5, para. 205.
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sultation between governmental departments, 5 an informal sanc-
tion would require a substantial amount of exchange of informa-
tion and consultation regarding the most appropriate way in which
to penalize a company. Ironically, in these circumstances, the cost
of applying the informal sanction might well equal that of formal
enforcement by statute.
Additionally, information regarding breaches of the rules may
not be readily available. Not only may employees possibly not ap-
ply for permission, but jobs might be changed during the two year
period. Although a change in employers is covered by the rules66 no
explicit provision provides for reporting by the former civil servant
of post-employment activities. Without such information, informal
sanctions against companies may have limited effect.
Most post-employment limitations, particularly those which
specifically limit employment, require less reporting. Currently,
Great Britain has no statutory system of reporting. By comparison,
United States guidelines for presidential appointees impose a re-
quirement of reporting after presidential appointees leave their
government positions.6 7 Although post-employment reporting im-
poses burdens upon both the former employee and the govern-
ment, the limited number of senior civil servants subject to the
rules would ease the burden on the British civil service.
Ironically, another difficulty with the informal sanction against
companies suggested in the Royal Commission's Report is ethical.
The argument supporting the use of government discretionary
power over companies to penalize the hiring of a former high-level
civil servant without the permission of the government must run
something like this: the company has, without our permission,
knowingly violated the ethical rules by hiring a civil servant who
was bound by the rules. Therefore, the company should expect to
receive less favorable treatment in the letting of contracts, the giv-
ing of grants and other subsidies and in the application of laws and
rules regulating the company. The question remains, is it ethical
for the government to refuse to let a contract to a company on the
sole ground that the company hired a former civil servant (against
whom no penalty is applied) without the government's permission?
Is it ethical for the government to refuse a grant on this ground or
65. Wilding, The Professional Ethic of the Administrator, 34 MANAGEMENT SERVICES IN
GOV'T 181 (1979).
66. ESTABLISHMENT OFFICERS' GUIDE, supra note 36, para. 4258.
67. R. VAUGHN, supra note 1, at 103.
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to impose a requirement not imposed upon a competitor solely for
this reason? May the government cite such grounds for withhold-
ing technical advice that would otherwise be provided?
In some circumstances, as with a contract, an argument re-
garding the hiring might go to a legitimate requirement of the con-
tract, such as the character of the offeror apart from contracts. In
many situations the hiring by the company may not be relevant to
criteria established for grants for technical assistance. In these in-
stances it seems inappropriate for the government to use a crite-
rion not spelled out in law to penalize a company. Even where the
government has broader discretion, penalizing a company on such
grounds suggests an arbitrary and improper use of power for pur-
poses linked to the interests of the civil service. In these situations,
the informal sanctions are likely to be applied secretly, without
well defined criteria and with little recourse. Reliance on informal
sanctions to enforce this rule also involves the risk that the govern-
ment may use its power in other circumstances where there may be
less agreement regarding the soundness of the objective.
c. Suggestion for Change
Sanctions pose particular difficulties for the law partly because
we are remarkably ignorant of the effect of legal sanctions. The
rule on the acceptance of business appointments by retiring or re-
signing civil servants creates additional difficulties because the
context of the rule deprives the government of the administrative
remedies normally available against civil servants.
i) Contractual Remedies
In 1977, the Expenditure Committee suggested that the civil
service rules should be incorporated into the contracts of civil ser-
vants, thereby providing a contractual remedy against the civil ser-
vant."s The government rejected this suggestion, arguing that re-
straints on individuals' employment once they left the service must
be shown to be reasonable and that support for such restraints
would be difficult to establish. 9
Support for the government's opinion rests upon the common
68. ELEVENTH REPORT, supra note 55, para. 42. There is some precedent in English em-
ployment law that rules not explicitly included can still become part of the employment
contract. R. RIDEOUT, PRINCIPLES OF LABOUR LAW 29-30 (3d ed. 1979).
69. TWELFTH REPORT, supra note 58, app. 5, at p. 44.
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law prohibition of contracts in restraint of trade. A contract that
limits a person in the free exercise of his business or trade is prima
facie unenforceable unless it is shown to be reasonable with refer-
ence to the interests of the parties and of the public.70 The sole
justifications are: (1) protection of trade secrets and confidential
information and (2) protection of trade connections.7 1 Employment
limitations are reviewed by the courts more rigorously than other
contractual limitations; 2 the space and time limitations sought are
of the greatest relevance, with a nationwide restriction requiring
exceptional justification.73
This body of law suggests that imposition of a contractual lim-
itation might be difficult. The English law, however, allows a con-
tractual prohibition against an employee accepting other employ-
ment if it appears that the employee would be likely to use
confidential information gained in his previous position to benefit
his subsequent employer.74 The employer seeking to impose the re-
striction must demonstrate that the employment was of a confi-
dential nature.7 5 This should not be difficult in the civil service
since administrative and statutory provisions limit the release of
confidential information," and since the Civil Service Code focuses
upon the. protection of confidential information. The administra-
tive declination of a request can be, in effect, a reaffirmation of the
need to protect confidential information which is likely to benefit a
prospective employer.
Considerable uncertainty surrounds the applicability of the
common law contractual rules to the Crown as an employer. The
common law rules arose in the context of commerce and trade and
none of the principle cases concern a public employer. Therefore,
the attitude of the courts regarding the application of these com-
mon law rules to determine the reasonableness of a contractual
limitation based upon the need to protect confidential governmen-
tal information remains unclear. Although the English law does
70. CHrrv's, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 961-962 (A. Guest ed. 24th ed. 1977). The
burden is upon the party seeking to rely upon the contract to show that it is reasonable
considering the interests of the parties. If this is established, the burden falls upon the party
attacking the provision to show that it is contrary to the public interest.
71. Id. § 969.
72. Id. § 974.
73. Id. § 980.
74. Id. § 977.
75. Id. § 978.
76. See text accompanying notes 149-172 infra.
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not necessarily seem to foreclose use of the contractual remedy, the
uncertainty may be another reason for the government's hesitancy
to adopt the Expenditure Committee's suggestion.
In its response to the Expenditure Committee, the government
raised two other reservations regarding the use of a contractual
provision to enforce the limitations on the acceptance of business
appointments by retiring or resigning civil servants. First, the gov-
ernment suggested that the contractual remedy might be of limited
usefulness once the civil servant signed a contract with a subse-
quent employer.77 This concern does not seem well founded be-
cause a breach of the contract provision would permit an employer
to seek an injunction either to prevent the employee from ac-
cepting subsequent employment, or to terminate the employment
and demand an accounting for damages. In addition, damages
could be recovered from the company or organization for inducing
the civil servant's breach of his employment contract.78
Second, the government suggested that limitations based upon
the protection of confidential information might be difficult to ap-
ply if limited to the class of civil servants now covered by the civil
service rule.79 As a contractual matter, if the limitation were rea-
sonable the employer would seem to have some choice as to the
class of employees to bind. The selection of employees in the civil
service is certainly not arbitrary but focuses on those employees
most likely to have access to confidential information. Thus, by ad-
dressing itself to political, rather than legal difficulties, the govern-
ment's argument opposing a parliamentary exception to the com-
mon law rules is weakened.
The author suggests that a contractual remedy would have
much to recommend it. Unlike criminal sanctions, it would provide
the government with a number of flexible sanctions and thereby
increase its likelihood of enforcement. Accordingly, the use of a
contractual remedy should not be rejected without an additional
examination of the arguments.
Similarly, a statutory provision removing the common law lim-
itations should not be rejected without further inquiry. In addition
to the effectiveness of the contractual remedies, other policies sup-
port the application of this exception to the Crown. First, common
law rules applicable to traders in a commercial context inade-
77. GOV'T OBSERVATIONS, supra note 21, para. 29.
78. CHiTTY'S, supra note 70, §§ 1673-74, 1676, 1684.
79. TWELFTH REPORT, supra note 58, app. 5, at p. 44.
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quately reflect the significant public interest in post-employment
restrictions on public employees. Second, the common law rules
have not considered the application of these restrictions to a public
employer. Since there seems to be no legal restraint to such parlia-
mentary action, the exception for the Crown could be drawn
broadly or narrowly in order to recognize the unusual aspects of
the Crown as an employer.
ii) Statutory Penalties
As an alternative, the Expenditure Committee suggested pe-
nalizing by statutory penalty companies that hire former employ-
ees in violation of the rules. The government noted that the Royal
Commission of Standards of Conduct in Public Life argued against
the application of the criminal law and the government suggested
that appropriate penalties would be difficult to prescribe.80 The
Royal Commmission argued that an attempt to apply the criminal
law under such circumstances would be wrong.8s The Royal Com-
mission, however, did not give any specific reasons for its conclu-
sions. Presumably, the Commission did not believe that the offense
was of a criminal character. Criminal statutes are the strongest
statements that a society can make regarding the acceptability of
conduct.
A fine against a company poses practical difficulties. Since the
fine could be treated as a business expense by the company, the
fine would have to be large enough to deter violations. Arguably, a
fine against the civil servant would face the same difficulty; thus, if
the company were sufficiently anxious to hire the civil servant, it
could simply adjust the civil servant's remuneration to account for
the fine. It is not known whether the stigma of criminal conduct
itself would be a sufficient deterrent to the corporation or the civil
servant contemplating violation of the rule.
The effectiveness of sanctions depends upon the enforcement
authority as well as the character of the sanction. Civil sanctions
leave enforcement to the departments that currently apply the ex-
isting rules. Criminal sanctions would give criminal law enforce-
ment authorities the primary responsibility for any action. The
likelihood of the application of a sanction can be affected by the
attitudes of enforcement authorities as well as by the character of
80. GOV'T OBSERVATIONS, supra note 21, para. 31.
81. SALMON REPORT, supra note 5, para. 204.
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the sanction.
B. Examination of the Rules
Ultimately, a discussion of sanctions involves an examination
of the content of the rules themselves. First, by allowing the impo-
sition of conditions, the rule may impose more specific limitations
such as prohibitions against aiding or assisting in particular mat-
ters, limitations on acting as an agent or representative of the com-
pany in particular matters, and limitations on the extent and char-
acter of contact between an employee and his former department.
Second, the appropriateness of different sanctions, including the
costs willing to be borne by the public in their enforcement, rests
upon an assessment of the character of the evils that the rules were
designed to remedy.
The rules regarding the acceptance of business appointments
arose from an investigation of the conduct of a permanent secre-
tary who, while personally engaged in the negotiation with a com-
pany over an important contract, discussed with certain company
board members the possibility of his employment with the com-
pany upon leaving the civil service.82 The rules were designed to
minimize this risk. One commentary on civil service states that al-
though the rules make it nearly impossible for a senior civil ser-
vant to secure a contract for a particular company in return for a
job, many subtle pressures may influence a civil servant to modify
his conduct with the possibility of a future job in mind.8 3
A recent example of this risk involved the breaking of the oil
sanctions order against Rhodesia, a scandal that received wide
public attention in Britain.8" After the Rhodesian government's
declaration of independence in 1965, the British government im-
posed economic sanctions, including prohibiting the sale of oil by
British Petroleum and British Shell to Rhodesia. Following allega-
tions that British Petroleum and Shell were involved in direct and
indirect breaches of the sanctions order, the Foreign and Common-
wealth Office commissioned an inquiry which raised a number of
questions regarding the involvement and knowledge of the British
82. SALMON REPORT, supra note 5, para. 199; See also Evidence Submitted by The Civil
Service Department, Annex B in RECORDS OF EVIDENCE, supra note 16 (ref. no. HO 241/22).
83. P. KELLNER AND N. CROWTHER-HUNT, supra note 53, at 198.
84. 957 HANSARD'S PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, Nov. 7-8, 1978, cols. 694-921, 961-1145;
See also M. BAILEY, OILGATE: THE SANCTIONS SCANDAL (1979) (the author traces the devel-
opment of the scandal).
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government and the conduct of civil servants in the Foreign Office
and in the Ministry of Power. 5
Civil servants in the Ministry of Power played a substantial
role in contacts between the oil companies and the government by
advising the government and by providing information to the ap-
propriate ministers.8 6
At least one senior civil servant, an assistant secretary of the
Petroleum Division of the Ministry of Power during the critical pe-
riod in 1968-69, subsequently accepted employment with British
Petroleum. 7 Jeremy Bray, a member of Parliament and former
parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Power, explicitly noted
the effect of post-employment opportunities on policy formula-
tion88 and identified the former head of the Petroleum Division as
one whose links with the oil companies influenced government pol-
icy in favor of the oil companies.8 9
Another less notable case involving a non-civil service crown
servant 0 cast additional light on the impact of clearance proce-
dures and the lack of sanctions on the effectiveness of the screen-
ing procedures.
In 1973, the Director of Finance of the Crown Agents resigned
85. The Report found that until 1967 sales were made by subsidiaries of British Petro-
leum and Shell to customers delivering the oil directly in some cases from the Shell Refinery
in Mozambique to Rhodesia. In late 1967, a swap arrangement whereby orders of customers
suspected of selling to Rhodesia would be filled by a French oil group was arranged for an
equivalent quantity of oil by British Petroleum and Shell Companies in South Africa. RE-
PORT OF THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE ON THE SUPPLY OF PETROLEUM AND PETRO-
LEUM PRODUCTS TO RHODESIA 214 (1978) (T.H. Bingham Q.C.) [hereinafter cited as BINGHAM
REPORT]. This arrangement ended in 1971 and oil was again shipped directly to Rhodesia
from the Shell Refinery in Mozambique. Id. at 215.
86. Id. at 80, 85-86, 89, 99, 105, 108, 220, 240.
87. BINGHAM REPORT, supra note 85, at 108.
88. 957 HANSARD'S PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES Nov. 7, 1978, col. 794. The former Under
Secretary of the Petroleum Division "retired and sought the reward that, alas, seems now to
be the expectation of many civil servants who have had responsibilities for the industry." Id.
In recent testimony before a House of Commons committee, the Minister of State for The
Civil Service Department stated that investigation of the circumstances of the case "do not
seem to me to accord with what has been said in the House of Commons." TREASURY AND
CIVIL SERVICE COMMITTEE, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, Monday, Feb. 4, 1980, para. 217 (1979-80).
89. 957 HANSARD'S PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES Nov. 7, 1978, col. 795.
90. Report by the Committee of Inquiry appointed by the Minister of Overseas Devel-
opment into the circumstances which led to the Crown Agents requesting financial assis-
tance from the Government in 1974, H.C. 48 (Dec. 1, 1977). A more complete discussion of
the Report on the Crown Agents may be found in Hood, The Crown Agents Affair, 56 PUB.
AD. 297 (1978). With the decline of colonial business, however, the crown agents became
involved in other more speculative interests which, ultimately, required government assis-
tance as considerable sums were lost.
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to accept a post with a financial company. Since he had previously
dealt with the company in an official capacity,"' the move attracted
considerable criticism. 9 2 The Director did not apply for permission
to take the appointment but the Chairman of the Crown Agents
believed that permission was required and consulted the Minister
of Overseas Development for approval.9 3 The Civil Service Depart-
ment was also consulted. Despite reservations, the Ministry be-
lieved there was "no alternative to passing the application. '94 This
attitude seems based on a belief that, in the last resort, no one
could stop the resignation."
While the Committee confirmed that proper procedures had
been followed,96 the findings suggest weaknesses in the administra-
tion of the civil service rules, particularly as they relate to the de-
sire to remove the risks that a public servant will not tailor official
action to enhance subsequent job prospects. While Crown Agents
are not civil servants, the civil service procedures, including consul-
tation with the Civil Service Department, were followed. Thus, the
case suggests how the loss of an effective sanction may influence
consideration of the merits of claims.
Post-employment prohibitions aimed at reducing the risk of
improper influence of officials by job prospects are difficult to
draw. One approach is the mandate in the civil service rules requir-
ing permission before positions are accepted, thus allowing a re-
view of official conduct. Another approach is to limit employment
with particular employers either permanently or for a stated pe-
riod.97 Though both approaches somewhat reduce the unconscious
effects of such prospects by making the desired employment seem
less certain or immediate, they cannot remove all risks that an offi-
91. The Crown Agents were Crown servants whose main work was the procurement of
supplies for colonies and, as the demand arose, their work extended to stamp issuance, in-
surance, provision of inspection facilities, and personnel services, such as recruitment. Re-
port by the Committee on Inquiry, supra note 90, para. 320.
92. Id., para. 321.
93. Id., para. 320.
94. Id., para. 322.
95. Due to change in pension policy and the transferability of pension rights, the for-
mer penalty of losing one's pension was no longer applicable. The Director's departure
caused bitterness among the Crown Agents. Id.
96. Id., para. 328.
97. An example in the United States is the Consumer Product Safety Commission. Top
staff of the Commission are prohibited from accepting compensation from a manufacturer
regulated by the Consumer Product Safety Act for one year after leaving the commission. 15
U.S.C. § 2053 (1976).
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cial will nevertheless tailor official acts with an eye to future
employment.
A second concern is that former civil servants who accept busi-
ness appointments will use confidential information gained while
in public service to benefit a subsequent employer to the detriment
of competitors or to the detriment of the government. Caution re-
quires that this fear be specifically articulated. In some instances,
the exchange of information may benefit the government as well as
the subsequent employer, for example, where technical expertise
on government standards improves contract performance. In these
circumstances, the interests of third parties are the most likely to
be affected if the confidential information benefits a competitor.
Also, it is difficult to distinguish between confidential information
and the knowledge and expertise that would have been acquired by
the civil servant in comparable employment. 9s Still the risks are
seen to be great enough that the British statutes and regulations
extensively limit the release of confidential information.
The use of confidential information by a civil servant on be-
half of a subsequent employer can normally be prevented only by
preventing the civil servant from taking the position. The value of
some confidential information, such as information regarding pro-
posed financial or tax policy may be limited by its nature. In these
circumstances, an automatic waiting period or one imposed after
review of the individual case may be sufficient. The common law
contractual remedies allowing an employer to limit the employee's
subsequent employment seek to protect confidential information.9
A third concern is that a former civil servant may exercise un-
due influence over colleagues. This concern seems greatest with
former high ranking civil servants who have established extensive
relationships through a long career with the civil service. These
personal and professional relationships provide an asset that few
possess and which is attributable solely to the individual's position
as a public employee. Some variation of this attitude probably
motivates the public calls to stop pension payments to retired civil
servants who have accepted business appointments. 100
98. Richard Posner has argued that the hiring of agency employees by a regulated in-
dustry could signify that agency personnel are hired because their training has made them
more productive and they are attracted initially to government service because increased
lifetime earning power compensates for temporarily lower wages. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 391 (1973).
99. See text accompanying notes 70-79 supra.
100. Editorial, The Guardian, Jan. 4, 1980, at 10, col. 2.
No. 2]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
By limiting or restricting the contacts of the retiring or re-
signing civil servant, the influence of the individual can be limited
without denying that person employment with any particular firm.
While there remain difficulties, including the treatment of personal
contacts, the requirement that the civil servant report contacts
with his former department increases the likelihood that violations
will be discovered.
While the debate in Britain regarding post-employment re-
strictions occurs against a different background than that in the
United States, the same issues emerge. One issue, less often stated
in Britain, is the use of post-employment restrictions as institu-
tional reform. In the United States, post-employment limitations
are seen as one way of reducing the influence of regulated indus-
tries in the regulatory process. 1' 1
Due to the stability of the British civil service, the need for
post-employment limitations as an institutional reform is less ap-
parent than with its United States counterpart. One commentator,
after listing in detail the civil servants who have accepted business
appointments and the organizations that they have joined, argues
that the greatest concern is the influence that such appointments
give to particular interest groups. Because of the knowledge, expe-
rience and contacts that former high level civil servants bring,
these groups enjoy substantial advantages in dealing with the gov-
ernment.102 Moreover, since only the well established, financed,
and highly regarded organizations are able to attract these former
civil servants, post-employment practices further strengthen the
hold of these groups in British politics. 03
1. Professional Ethics as a Limitation
The ethics of professional groups as well as administrative reg-
ulations impose post-employment limitations. Perhaps the clearest
example is the legal profession. In the United States, for example,
ethical rules designed to limit the activities of former government
attorneys and their present firm have been a focus of debate. 104 An
101. See R. VAUGHN, supra note 1, at 79-86.
102. Jordan and Richardson, supra note 53, at 415-16.
103. Id. at 416.
104. Comment, Conflicts of Interest and the Former Government Authority, 65 GEO.
L.J. 1025 (1977). Recent litigation focuses on appropriate screening measures. See Arm-
strong v. McAlpin, 606 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1979), vacated 265 F.2d 433 (1980) (en banc); Kes-
selhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl. 1977); Price v. Admiral Ins. Co., 481 F. Supp.
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examination of the restraints provided by professional ethics in
Britain further explains how the character of the British civil ser-
vice has changed the tone of the debate on post-employment
limitations.
In Great Britian, the legal profession is divided into two
groups of practitioners, barristers and solicitors. 105 As a general
rule, barristers are engaged or instructed by solicitors to represent
lay clients in court and to perform specific tasks'"c while solicitors
are directly hired by lay clients as their advisers and representa-
tives.1 7 In addition to private practice, barristers and solicitors are
employed in commerce and government.108
Ethical rules applicable to barristers and solicitors10 limit the
post-employment activities of former government attorneys. Bar-
risters may not accept a brief or instructions on matters concerned
with any firm or company in which the barrister has been em-
ployed or associated with as a partner or director.110 Thus, a bar-
rister who has served in a government department in any capacity,
legal or non-legal, may not in practice deal with any matter which
he dealt with while employed in that department."" Each practic-
ing barrister is a sole practitioner '112 and a barrister is not allowed
to enter into a partnership with another barrister except regarding
work overseas.113 Affiliation of barristers in professional chambers
374 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
105. See generally FINAL REPORT OF Tim ROYAL COMMSSION ON LEGAL SEavIcEs, CMND.
No. 7648 (1979), an exhaustive study of the legal profession in Great Britain [hereinafter
cited as LEGAL SERVICES REPORT].
106. Such as drafting a document, or advising in writing or at a conference.
107. LEGAL SEavicEs REPORT, supra note 105, paras. 17.1-17.7.
108. See generally id. ch. 20. In employment, the distinctions between the two
branches of the profession do not rigidly apply. Id. para. 20.22. Approximately 3,400 lawyers
serve the government-500 as barristers and 2,900 as solicitors. In central government ser-
vice, there are approximately 450 solicitors; in local government, there are approximately 60
barristers and 2,450 solicitors. Id. These figures do not include lawyers serving in non-legal
capacities, but aside from chief executives in local government, the use of lawyers in admin-
istrative positions is considerably less than in the United States. CIVnL SEavicE REPORT,
supra note 26, app. C., at 152. The movement of chief executives of local government into
private practice is not substantial. Interview with C. Dyer, Assistant Secretary for Profes-
sional and Public Relations of the Law Society, in London, England, March 11, 1980.
109. LEGAL SERvicES REPORT, supra note 105, chs. 25-26.
110. Letter from the Secretary of the Professional Conduct Committee of the Senate of
the Inns of Court and The Bar to the Author, Feb. 19, 1980; see- generally W. BOLTON,
CoNDucT AND ETIQUETrE AT THE BAn (6th ed. 1975).
111. Letter of Feb. 19, 1980, supra note 110.
112. Id.
113. LEGAL SERvicES REPORT, supra note 105, para. 33.56.
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is, for convenience only, and "does not in any way preclude two
barristers in the same set of chambers from being on opposite sides
of a case."114 Therefore, barristers are untroubled by rules such as
are found in the United States where the disqualification of a sin-
gle member of a firm by an ethical rule serves to disqualify the
entire firm.
The Guide of Professional Conduct applicable to solicitors
lists circumstances in which a solicitor should decline to act for a
client.115 These include situations where there exist conflicts of in-
terests between the solicitor and clients or where the solicitor's ac-
tions on behalf of a client might appear to prejudice the interests
of another client.116 These conflicts are created when a solicitor has
knowledge of an opponent's case because of his previous represen-
tation of that opponent. 1 7 Arguably, this general rule would apply
to a solicitor who, during government service, obtained information
regarding a matter that could prejudice the government's interests
if the solicitor, -after leaving government, represents a third party
in the matter against the government.
The Guide also cautions a solicitor against representing a par-
ticular client on a matter that might be embarrassing to the solici-
tor because of his previous actions in an official capacity.1 8 The
thrust of the rule seems to be the prevention of the appearance of
undue influence and the control of the use of confidential informa-
tion. While the rule and the examples given concern principally
part-time appointments, the rule would also seem to cover the ac-
ceptance of cases by solicitors who had previously served in gov-
ernment. The solicitor's acceptance of clients regarding a matter in
which the solicitor had acted in an official capacity creates the
same risks of undue influence anld control of confidential informa-
tion which the rule addresses.
The Guide for solicitors does not disqualify all partners or as-
sociates of a firm from acting in matters from which another mem-
ber of the firm is disqualified. The Guide does state, however, that
the liability of one partner for the unprofessional conduct of an-
other will depend upon his knowledge and involvement. "The ex-
114. Letter of Feb. 19, 1980, supra note 110.
115. COUNCIL OF THE LAW SocIErY, A GUIDE TO THE PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF SOLICI-
TORS 8 (1974).
116. Id. at 9.
117. Id. at 9, citing Grissel v. Pete [1832] 2 M. & Scott 2.
118. GUIDE TO PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 115, at 10.11.
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tent of personal involvement would clearly be material in relation
to whether disciplinary proceedings are taken against all partners
or only against those clearly at fault."119 This portion of the Guide
deals primarily with the neglect of clients' business and does not
seem to impose a vicarious disqualification. The rule, however,
would seem to prevent a partner who was ethically prohibited from
representing a particular client from communicating information
to another partner qualified to act in the matter.
Since neither barristers nor solicitors have ethical rules specifi-
cally dealing with attorneys who formerly served in government,
the inference may be drawn that the structure of the British civil
service affects the tone of the debate on post-employment limita-
tions. The stability of the British civil service, combined with the
use of attorneys in the civil service in traditional legal roles and
the less substantial role of the judiciary in British policymaking,
influence the perceptions surrounding the movement of lawyers
from government to private practice. While the basic ethical con-
siderations are similar to those in the United States, the British
rules are less specifically articulated. Little public or professional
discussion surrounds the question of post-employment limitations
on attorneys who have served in government.
While the issues remain similar, the difference in the focus of
the debate demonstrates that the conditions generating support for
post-employment limitations can arise in a civil service more stable
than that of the United States. The similarity of issues suggests
that questions regarding the propriety of post-employment activi-
ties arise because policies in both the United States and Britain
seek to keep separate the public and private sectors despite sub-
stantial government involvement in the private sector. The greater
stability of the British Civil Service accounts for the differences in
the focus of the debate.
2. Local Government
Limitations resting on professional ethics may in part account
for the different character of post-employment limitations in Brit-
ish local governments. The Redcliffe-Maud Report found it was
not uncommon for retiring or resigning employees to enter private
practice as solicitors, architects and planning consultants in the
119. Id. at 26.
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authority's geographic area.120 The Committee felt that such prac-
tices created the risk that inside knowledge of the authority's poli-
cies and procedures would give a former employee's clients an im-
proper advantage over competitors and that the employee might
be tempted to tailor his official actions in anticipation of prospec-
tive employment. 12 1 The Committee recommended that rules simi-
lar to those applicable to the civil service be imposed on certain
local government employees requiring that an officer obtain the
written permission of the authority before taking employment in-
volving the exercise of his professional skills "within the area of
the authority for two years after retirement or resignation." '22
The Royal Commission's Report, while recognizing the danger,
failed to endorse this recommendation because of the difficulties of
enforcement; the possible damaging effects of recruitment of pro-
fessional staff;1 28 the potential political character of local authority
decisions in individual cases; 24 and, the need for some experience
with such limitations at the local level.125 To date, no official action
has been taken on the recommendation of the Redcliffe-Maud
Committee.
While the Redcliffe-Maud Report refers to one county council
in England that imposed post-employment limitations similar to
those recommended by the Committee, 26 none of the local author-
ities examined have adopted formal limitations of this character.
Nonetheless, where an appointment might raise questions regard-
ing its propriety, many of the local authorities informally require
that employees (particularly high ranking employees) consult with
an appropriate senior official prior to taking the appointment.
127
Since local authorities failed to perceive substantial abuse in this
area, 1 28 the informal restraints appeared adequate.
The experience of the authorities' studies present a number of
120. REDCLIFFE-MAuD REPORT, supra note 4, para. 99.
121. Id.
122. Id. para. 101.
123. SALMON REPORT, supra note 5, para. 203.
124. See id. para- 206.
125. Id. par. 207.
126. REDCLIFFE-MAUD REPORT, supra note 4, part 101.
127. City of Wakefield Metropolitan District Council, Wakefield Code of Probity, para.
6.1; Collins Interview, supra note 22; Cooper Interview, supra note 22; Pettifer Interview,
supra note 22 (consultation is an informal, but well established, convention); Walters-Da-
vies Interview, supra note 22 (officer of goodwill will consult).
128. Letter from W. G. Hopkin, County Secretary, Kent County Council, to Author
(Feb. 27, 1980), at 1.
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difficulties. Little basis exists for evaluating the scope of the prob-
lem or for judging the effectiveness of the informal practices and
conventions. The uniformity ot view among chief executives and
legal officers regarding the limited scope of the problem suggests at
least a shared perception of the effectiveness of existing conven-
tions. If this perception is correct, the situation in local govern-
ment is substantially different from that described in the civil ser-
vice. Thus, it appears that in local government, the lack of codified
rules without accompanying legal sanctions has not created the
type of public concern and controversy surrounding the issue in
the civil service.129
As a practical matter the informal sanctions of local govern-
ment may be more effective than those available to the civil ser-
vice. The officers leaving local government to assume outside em-
ployment creating concern are, as the Redcliffe-Maud Report
noted, likely to be professionals such as lawyers, accountants, engi-
neers, and surveyors. Each of these professions has ethical stan-
dards that limit the use of confidential information obtained from
a previous client or employer;130 these standards are enforced by
professional discipline which can threaten a potential loss of liveli-
hood. Accordingly, the professional affiliation of many local gov-
ernment officers has significant implications for local government
ethics." 1
As private practitioners most of these professionals will seek
to maintain cordial relations with their former employers. The con-
tinuity of these relations, when combined with the smaller size of
local authority employment, suggests that informal sanctions such
as disapproval may influence the conduct of officers and former of-
ficers. This interest is not necessarily found in high-level civil ser-
vants who are employed by a particular company.
The movement of local government officers into private occu-
pations has not attracted wide public attention partly because of
129. See text accompanying notes 50-119, supra.
130. See. e.g., The Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy, Professional
Obligations and Conduct-Guidance to Members para. 13; Interview with J. E. Bell, Under
Secretary Professional Division, The Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Account-
ancy in London, England (Feb. 11, 1980); 2 PRiME MUsTR'S COMMTEE ON LocAL Gov-
ERNMENT RULES OF CoNDUcT, WRrrrEN EvIDENCE, CmND. No. 5636, at 20 (Association of
Local Government Finance Officers), 127 (The Institution of Municipal Engineers), 177
(The Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors-Scottish Branch) (1974). As to solicitors and
barristers, see text accompanying notes 104-19 supra.
131. See text accompanying note 214 infra.
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the differences in the employing organizations noted above, the of-
ficer often moves into private practice rather than to employment
with an identified organization that has had dealings with the au-
thority and perhaps with the officer. Although the officer as private
practitioner may then accept professional fees from the same com-
pany, the difference tends to obscure the problem and make media
discussion more difficult.
C. The United States Model
In the United States, a number of statutes regulate the activi-
ties of former public employees. Statutory controls exist both in
the federal government and in a number of state governments.
These provisions evidence the widespread statutory regulation of
the public service in the United States.
1. Federal Civil Service
a. Ethics in Government Act
The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 amended the then ex-
isting post-employment provisions and imposed new restrictions.132
While the post-employment provisions of the Act are complex, the
Act basically contains four prohibitions. The first prohibition is a
lifetime bar on representation of matters in which a former govern-
ment employee had substantial personal participation while in gov-
ernment. The Act, however, broadens the previous prohibition by
expanding the concepts of representation beyond action as an
agent or attorney and includes informal as well as formal appear-
ances. Moreover, appearance may include a written as well as an
oral communication intended to influence agency action.
The second prohibition is a two year post-employment bar on
representation of matters that were within a former employee's of-
ficial responsibility within one year prior to the employee's termi-
nation. This prohibition broadens previous restrictions by ex-
panding the concept of representation. In addition, the Act
extends the application of the prohibition by placing a two year
bar rather than the one year bar contained in the previous statute.
The third prohibition was not previously in the federal stat-
132. Pub. L. No. 95-521, § 501(a), 92 Stat. 1824 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 207 (Supp. II
1978)). See also The Final Rule on Post Employment Conflict of Interest, issued by the
Office of Personnel Management, 45 Fed. Reg. 7402 (1980) (to be codified in 5 C.F.R. § 737).
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utes. Certain high-level officials (including ones designated admin-
istratively) may not by personal appearance aid or assist in the
representation of matters in which the former employee had sub-
stantial personal participation as a government employee. 13 3
The fourth prohibition, with some statutory exceptions, re-
strains certain high-level officials (including ones designated ad-
ministratively) from contacting their former agencies regarding any
matters pending before the agencies in which the United States
has a direct and substantial interest for one year after leaving gov-
ernment service. According to this prohibition, the former em-
ployee need not have been connected with the matter in any way
as a government employee and the matter need not be one that
was pending before an employee's former agency while he was a
government employee.
Violation of any of these prohibitions may lead to a fine not
exceeding $10,000, imprisonment for not more than two years, or
both.'4 The Act provides for some administrative sanctions al-
lowing an agency to prohibit for a period of five years an employee
who violates any of the prohibitions from making any formal or
informal appearances before the agency or from making an oral or
written communication to the agency with the intent to influence
the agency regarding a pending matter.23 5
The Act also establishes an Office of Government Ethics to ad-
minister portions of the Act, to review agency performance, and to
advise employees regarding the requirements of the Act. The Office
of Government Ethics may designate certain positions beyond
those statutorily prescribed for coverage by the third and fourth
prohibitions.L3 6
Although the Ethics in Government Act regulates the conduct
of former government employees who accept positions with outside
groups, it does not prohibit them from accepting these positions.
One federal statute, however, prevents higher ranking officials of
the Consumer Product Safety Commission from accepting certain
positions.
133. Pub. L. No. 95-521, § 501(a), 92 Stat. 1824, as amended by Act of June 22, 1979,
Pub. L. No. 96-28, 93 Stat. 76, 18 U.S.C. § 207 (Supp. HI 1979).
134. Id. § 207(c).
135. Id. § 2070).
136. Id. § 207(d)(1)(C).
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b. Consumer Product Safety Act
The Consumer Product Safety Act provides that no regular
employee of the Commission who was compensated above a partic-
ular level (GS-14) shall accept employment or compensation from
any manufacturer subject to the Consumer Product Safety Act for
a period of twelve months after ending employment with the Com-
mission.5 7 The provision was designed to assure the public that
the principal employees of the Commission will not tailor their of-
ficial acts to ingratiate themselves to potential employers.
The Office of Legal Counsel of the United States Department
of Justice has advised that such a prohibition is proper exercise of
congressional power. 38 The provision carries no criminal sanction
but, according to the Department of Justice, it may be enforced in
an action for breach of contract. Accordingly, the Commission may
prevent the employment of the former employee by an action to
enjoin a threatened or an actual breach.
2. State and Local Government
The statutes of several states reflect the types of post-employ-
ment limitations applicable to state employees."' State statutes
prohibit the use of confidential information acquired through state
employment for personal gain.1 40 A few states such as Connecticut,
Delaware, and Massachusetts, not only prohibit the disclosure of
confidential information for private gain but also forbid the ac-
ceptance of employment which would require or encourage the
public employee to disclose confidential information. 41
Several states prohibit former public employees from receiving
any compensation for any services regarding matters that the
former employees have been connected with or participated in as
government employees for a period of two years following termina-
tion.142 Some of these statutes also limit the activities of the part-
ners of former government employees.1 48
137. Consumer Product Safety Act, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 2053 (1976).
138. These opinions are discussed in R. VAUGHN, supra note 1, at 91.
139. The analysis of state statutes is based upon material found in R. VAUGHN, PRINCI-
PLES OF CIVIL SERVICE LAW § 8.5(5), at 8-142 through 8-145 (1976).
140. Id. at 8-142.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 8-144. The states with the two year rule are Delaware, Iowa, 'Louisiana,
Missouri, New York and Washington.
143. Id.
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A Kansas statute prohibits a former state employee from ac-
cepting employment with any business for one year after terminat-
ing public employment if the employee participated in the making
of a government contract with that business within two years of
termination of public employment.14 Other states prohibit, for va-
rying periods of time, former public employees from representing
or assisting third parties in matters that former government em-
ployees had participated in personally and substantially as govern-
ment employees, or in matters that were subject to official action
by the employees' former agencies.14 5
In many ways the state statutes are similar to federal statutes.
State statutes, however, are more likely to prohibit not just certain
post-employment activities but also the acceptance of certain posi-
tions after termination of public employment.
D. Conclusion
The use of statutes to control public service ethics in the Brit-
ish experience with post-employment limitations suggests that
many perceive the reliance upon ethical restraints alone is insuffi-
cient and that some administrative, criminal or civil sanction must
be devised. In discussing the implications of post-employment lim-
itations for the United States, the British experience exemplifies
the weakness of a system of ethical controls operating without sup-
porting sanctions.
The debate regarding post-employment limitations may signal
the beginning of increased pressure for greater statutory control of
civil service ethics in Britain. Debate may have concerned post-
employment problems not only because the problem is visible but
also because of the real questions that exist regarding the propri-
ety of particular appointments. The post-employment debate in
Britain helps us to understand the circumstances in which statu-
tory control of an area of ethics is likely to be imposed.
The administrative approach to implementing the civil service
rules regarding the acceptance of business appointments exempli-
fies a possible model for the United States. While lacking sanc-
tions, this system allows the screening of individual cases and pro-
vides for the imposition of flexible conditions based upon the
circumstances of each case. For a number of reasons, the debate
144. Id. at 8-144, 8-145.
145. Id. at 8-145.
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surrounding the acceptance of business appointments by retiring
or resigning civil servants plays prominently in the subsequent ex-
amination of the implications of the British experience.
II. WHISTLEBLOWING
While whistleblowing does not stir as much controversy as
post-employment limitations, it exposes a number of the assump-
tions underlying ethics in the British public service including the
use of informal sanctions to enforce conventions of conduct.
Whistleblowing refers to the public criticism by agency employees
of shortcomings within the agency. Conflict occurs when an em-
ployee is confronted with an order of instruction that the employee
believes to be unconstitutional, illegal, or improper, and the em-
ployee discloses this knowledge.1 46 This complex of issues including
public criticism, disclosure of information within and outside an
agency, and the refusal to obey orders constitutes an area of ethi-
cal concern termed whistleblowing.
While whistleblowing issues generated considerable public de-
bate in the United States and led to legislation endorsing the pro-
priety of the release of information by agency employees exposing
certain types of agency wrongdoing, these issues have received less
attention in Great Britain where whistleblowing remains legally
prohibited and often condemned. Few cases have been widely pub-
lished 147 and there seems to be little agitation for changes in the
provisions that restrict whistleblowing. A number of factors ac-
count for the British treatment of whistleblowing in public life.
Among these are a wide range of rules and sanctions available
against an employee who releases information on agency miscon-
duct. These rules and sanctions reinforce a number of conventions
146. Vaughn, Public Employees and the Right to Disobey, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 261 (1977).
147. Some examples may be found in 2 HOME OFFICE, DEP'T COMMITTEE ON SECTION 2
OF THE OFFCim SECRETrS ACT, 1911, WRITTEN EVIDENCE, CmND. No. 5104 Part IV (1972)
[hereinafter cited as FRANKS COMMITTEE REPORT]. See also Evidence submitted by the Soci-
ety of Labor Lawyers in RECORDS OF EVIDENCE, supra note 16, at ref. no. HO 241/72, para. 4,
which lists several examples without elaboration. One case that received considerable atten-
tion in the press concerned the clerk of a local council, an instance that a departmental
inquiry found not to constitute whistleblowing. MINISTRY OF HousING AND LOCAL GOVERN-
mENT, THE REPORT OF THE BOGNOR REGIS INQUIRY (1965). Leslie Chapman, a former civil
service executive officer who published a book criticizing government over-spending, argues
that the principle of loyalty of a civil servant is to the public through its elected representa-
tives, and that only the publicizing of deficiencies in the civil service is likely to better con-
ditions. L. CHAPMAN, Introduction to the First Edition, in YOUR DISOBEDIENT SERVANT (rev.
ed. 1979).
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of the British civil service and British political conventions that
deny ethical legitimacy to whistleblowing.
A. The British Model
1. The Civil Service
The Official Secrets Acts 148 provide criminal penalties for the
release of government information. The principal provision threat-
ening civil servants is section 2 of the Official Secrets Act, 1911.149
This section prohibits civil servants and former civil servants from
revealing any government document or information to an unautho-
rized person. The section also prohibits a person from receiving
such document or information if the person has reason to believe
that the document or information is provided in violation of the
Act. A violation of either prohibition may be punished by up to
two years imprisonment. Although only thirty prosecutions oc-
curred under section 2 from 1916-1971,150 the availability of the
criminal sanctions is perceived as a deterrent to the release of in-
formation thereby causing civil servants to be extraordinarily cau-
tious.151 The acquittal of three Sunday Telegraph employees
charged with publishing an article that quoted a British diplomat's
report on the Nigerian Civil War resulted in the formation of a
committee by the Home Office to study section 2. The vagueness of
the provision was subsequently demonstrated. 15 2 Since 1971, sec-
tion 2 has been considerably weakened as a prosecutorial tool and
attempts to amend section 2 have been unsuccessful.15
Even without the criminal provisions of the Official Secrets
Act, 1911, a number of civil service rules limit the release of gov-
ernment information by civil servants and former civil servants.
Disciplinary sanctions, including dismissal, apply to violation of
148. The Official Secrets Acts are a series of Acts passed in 1888, 1911, and 1920. The
Acts restrict the release of specific information such as national security information. J.
AITKEN, OFFICIALLY SECRET 7-27 (1971).
149. Id. The section has been applied to nationalized industries and stationary agen-
cies, but not local authorities. J. MICHAEL, THE POLITICS OF SECRECY: THE CASE FOR A FREE-
DOM OF INFORMATION LAW 35 (1979).
150. 2 FRANKS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 147, at 116-18.
151. Id. at 402; J. MIcHAEL, supra note 149, at 6.
152. J. AITKEN, supra note 148, at 205-23.
153. From 1972-1976 there were eleven prosecutions under The Official Secrets Acts of
1911 and 1920. Of these, five were not convicted of any offense. Six of the eleven were
charged under section 1 of the 1911 Act. Three were not convicted. 950 HAsARD's PARLIA-
MENTARY DnATEs, May 16, 1978, col. 85.
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these rules and are effective in discouraging the release of official
information.154 In some cases where the Official Secrets Act would
apply, civil servants are dismissed rather than prosecuted under
the Act.15 5 In addition to criminal and disciplinary sanctions, in-
formal sanctions are important in preventing unauthorized
disclosures.1 56
Various procedural rules, such as the Civil Service Pay and
Conditions of Service Code, require a civil servant to obtain official
permission before taking part in any outside activity that involves
the disclosure of official information.157 Special guidance is set out
for outside activities, particularly publication of books or articles,
contacts with the press, broadcasts, speeches, lectures, or partici-
pation in conferences. These prohibitions are: (1) the disclosure of
any confidential information; (2) the disclosure of the relations be-
tween civil servants and ministers, including any confidential ad-
vice given to a minister; (3) comment on individuals or organiza-
tions that the civil servant's department would find objectionable;
and (4) the discussion of matters of current or potential political
controversy.1 58 In summary, no outside activity should conflict with
the interests of the civil servant's department or bring the good
name of the department or the civil service into disrepute. 59
The Establishment Officers' Guide discusses these rules in
more detail. The Guide emphasizes that the provisions limiting the
release and use of official information must be brought to the
attention of civil servants within each department and describes
special forms setting out the restrictions on the release of official
information160 that civil servants must sign upon entering and
leaving the department.
In deciding whether departments should give civil servants
permission to participate in outside activities the Guide notes that
departments "should maintain a bias toward observance of these
154. J. MicHAEL, supra note 149, at 6.
155. 1 FRANKS CoMMITEE REPORT, supra note 147, para. 59.
156. A civil servant who violates the rules and conventions regarding the release of in-
formation "will not enjoy such a satisfactory career as colleagues with better judgment and
greater discretion. He may fail to obtain promotion, or he may be given less important and
attractive jobs." Id. para. 58.
157. PAY & CONDITIONS CODE, supra note 35, para. 9910 (also covers outside activities
drawing on official experience).
158. Id. para 9911.
159. Id.
160. ESTABLISHMENT OFFicERs' GuIDE, supra note 36, para. 4121.
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principles rather than toward granting permission."'" Even if per-
mission is given, a department may still subject a speech or book
to amendment or deletion. 162 The Guide provides detailed gui-
dance concerning the participation by civil servants in broadcasts,
speeches or lectures, their attendance at outside conferences and in
the publication of books. Civil servants may not take part in a
broadcast discussing the merits of a policy that could be controver-
sial and are to be discouraged from participating in any broadcast
concerning a politically sensitive subject.13s Detailed procedures
are set out requiring, among other things, a civil servant to report
an invitation to the permanent head of a department and to con-
sult with the Chief Information Officer regarding the propriety of
participation.""4 In cases of doubt, the department is to consult
with the Civil Service Department.1 5
The Establishment Officers' Guide provides that a speech or
lecture bearing upon unofficial matters or drawing from official ex-
perience must be submitted to the permanent head of the depart-
ment for approval.1 6 Similar approval is required for participation
at outside conferences both as a representative of the depart-
ment 67 and in a private capacity if the conference is on a public
issue relating to the work of the civil servant's department.6 8 If
the civil servant is invited because of his outside experience or pre-
vious activities rather than because of his work in the department,
consent is to be readily given although the civil servant must be
careful not to express views that could be interpreted as resting
upon official information. 69
Permission is required before a civil servant or a former civil
servant may publish a book using official information.17 0 While
provisional permission may be given based on a brief outline of the
coverage of the book, the final version proposed to be published
must be submitted to the permanent head of the department for
161. Id. para. 4134.
162. Id.
163. Id. par. 4150.
164. Id. para. 4151-56.
165. Id. para. 4157.
166. Id. para. 4163.
167. Id. para. 4171.
168. Id. para. 4172.
169. Id.
170. Id. para. 4142.
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permission to be published.1 71
Departmental rules or staff manuals generally follow the pro-
visions of the Civil Service Code and Establishment Officers'
Guide. The Staff Handbook of the Department of the Environ-
ment provides more detailed guidance regarding the publication of
scientific, professional and technical papers.1 72 The Staff Rules of
the Department of Health and Social Security lists types of infor-
mation not to be released such as information relating to patents,
all departmental instructions to staff, particularly instruments re-
garding the exercise of discretion, and official communication, in-
formation or decisions. 173 The Staff Rules of the Department em-
phasize that the "disciplinary action will be taken in cases of
unauthorized disclosure. 17 4
a. Conventions Supporting Existing Practices
Several conventions of conduct in the civil service reinforce
and support sanctions applicable to the release of official informa-
tion by a civil servant. These conventions arise from different
sources, some are part of British political life, some are part of in-
stitutional practice, and some are personal codes of propriety. To-
gether they form a group of conventions inimical to the concept of
whistleblowing. These conventions also suggest the types of ethical
rules most likely to receive institutional support and most likely to
invoke informal sanctions.
The rigor of the restrictions on the release of offical informa-
tion supports the institutional interests of the government and of
civil servants. Since an institution's vulnerability to criticism is
limited to the extent that it can successfully control public access
to information regarding its practices and its officials' conduct,
rules which increase the institution's control over access to infor-
mation are favored by the government and civil servants. Both for-
171. Id. para. 4143. Ministers must submit memoirs and other writings for review by
the Secretary of the Cabinet. Because of the extensive use of official information descrip-
tions of cabinet meetings and relations with civil servants, the government attempted to
prevent the publication of Richard Crossman's famous diaries describing the work of a cabi-
net minister. H. YOUNG, THE CROSSMAN AFFAIR (1976) (describes the action against The
Times for publishing portions of the diaries).
172. DEP'T OF ENVIRONMENT, STAFF HANDBOOK § 110.30 (1975). Generally work is en-
couraged, and approval likely, if it is purely scientific and professional, relating to the civil
servant's interests, and in no way commits the department.
173. Dep't of Health & Social Security, Staff Rules, 14(5)(a)-(c).
174. Id. 15(5)(d).
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mal and informal sanctions are applied to ensure the institutional
interest of invulnerability to public criticism."
The absence of a freedom of information law in Great Britain
substantially affects the legal rights of whistleblowers and, perhaps
more importantly, denies to whistleblowers the source of legiti-
macy available in the United States. A freedom of information law
establishes that the public is entitled to certain government docu-
ments and records.176 Such a broad entitlement allows a civil ser-
vant, who releases official information, to argue that he is vindi-
cating the public's right to know. A freedom of information law at
least provides some external standard against which the
whistleblower may place the official position of his department and
reduces the potency of a department's argument that it alone may
decide what information can be released. The absence of a freedom
of information law in Great Britain provides the background
against which the conventions of conduct in the civil service are
applied.
The convention of ministerial responsibility, in theory, pro-
vides accountability of the minister to parliament for all official
actions taken by his department1 77 and ensures the neutrality of
civil servants.17 18 Civil servants serve the minister and the govern-
ment in power. They do not become personally identified with par-
ticular policies 179 and they implement as faithfully the policies of
one government as they would another.1 80 While the anonymity of
175. In the words of a Senior Foreign Office Official testifying in a 1971 prosecution
under section 2 of the Official Secrets Act, 1911, "it is no business of any official to try or
allow the government to be embarrassed. That is what we are working for." J. AITKEN, supra
note 148, at 142. "Various recommendations in recent years ... have criticized the almost
obsessional preoccupation with secrecy, yet decisions to alter the prevailing conditions are
often left to the very people most affected by them and proposals are quite understandably
ignored." Goldston, Patronage in British Government, 30 PARL. AFF. 80, 95 (1977).
176. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976). See generally J. O'RELLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DIsCLO-
SURE, chs. 1-19 (1977).
177. J. MITCHELL, CONSiTuTIoNAL LAW 176 (1964). Differing considerations apply, a
minister must protect a civil servant who carries out his explicit order or acts properly in
following a policy laid down by the minister. If the mistake of a civil servant is not on an
important policy issue or does not seriously affect individual rights, a minister accepts re-
sponsibility although he is not personally involved. If the civil servant's action is one of
which the minister disapproves or has no prior knowledge and is reprehensible, the minister
is still responsible for what went wrong but he is not required to defend the action, and may
take disciplinary action against the civil servants involved. E. WADE: & G. PHILLIPS, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL AND ADMIsmTRATv LAW 106 (9th ed. 1977) (citing Finer, 34 PuB. AD. 377 (1974)).
178. See Tickner, supra note 6.
179. Gunn, Politicians and Officials: Who Is Answerable?, 43 POL. Q. 253 (1972).
180. Ridley, Responsibility and the Official: Forms and Ambiguities, 10 Gov'T. & OP-
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civil servants has been broken in some inquiries, 81 and their ano-
nymity may be intruded upon by the Commissioner for Parliamen-
tary Affairs,'182 "only in the most exceptional cases will civil ser-
vants be named and identified in relation to the actions they have
taken in their departments."' 8 s
The theory of the convention of ministerial responsibility, the
anonymity of civil servants, the supremacy of parliament and the
political neutrality of civil servants form powerful arguments
against whistleblowing. Parliamentary supremacy and ministerial
responsibility deny the civil servant an appeal to some indepen-
dent authority as the basis for doing anything contrary to a min-
ster's instructions.8 Since parliament embodies the people's will
and is elected to determine the public interest, ministers are re-
sponsible to that parliament. Therefore, according to this ratio-
nale, as long as the minister must answer to parliament, ministerial
commands cannot be arbitrary.
It has been suggested that the main features of the constitu-
tional framework against which civil servants must act are "the to-
tal constitutional responsibility and therefore enormous authority
of the Minister, but tempered by collective responsibility subject
to the law and policed by Parliamentary scrutiny."'85 In this cli-
mate a whistleblower is committing "a politically hostile act" in-
consistent with his status as a civil servant. The options of the
British whistleblower are limited, he may complain internally to
the minister and if that is ineffective, he must resign before criti-
cizing a government action. 88 Parliamentary supremacy and minis-
POSITION 444, 450 (1975).
181. The Crichel Down investigation named civil servants. Wheare, Crichel Down Re-
visited, 23 POL. STuD. 390 (1975). The Vechile and General Affair Inquiry named a lower
level civil servant and attached responsibility to him. Baker, The V and G Affair and Min-
isterial Responsibility, 43 PuB. Q. 340 (1972); Chapman, The Vechile and General Affair:
Some Reflections on Public Administration in Britain, 51 PuB. AD. 273 (1973) (critical of
tribunal disregarding principle of concentrating responsibility at the top). The Bingham
Report named civil servants. BINGHAM REPORT, supra note 85 at 80, 85-86, 89, 99, 105, 108,
220, 240.
182. Fry, The Sachsenhausen Concentration Camp Case and the Convention of Minis-
terial Responsibility, 1970 PuB. L. 336, 357.
183. Wheare, supra note 181, at 404.
184. Wilding, supra note 65, at 181.
185. Id. at 183.
186. Id. There seem to be few resignations of protest. Ridley, supra note 180, at 465.
Another option may be to seek a different assignment. Tickner, supra note 6. "We may
assume that this does happen from time to time but it never comes into the open." Id. at
588.
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terial responsibility help civil servants to accept ministerial and
departmental decisions in good conscience.18 7 Legality and the
public interest are appropriately decided by parliament and a po-
litically neutral civil service lacks the basis upon which to question
them. In fact, these conventions act to reduce not only the legal
but also the ethical responsibility of a civil servant for the conduct
of government. Secrecy and confidentiality thus become part of the
professional values of the civil servant.188
Arguments opposing whistleblowing rest upon theories of min-
isterial responsibility. Such arguments assume that parliamentary
scrutiny combined with the responsibility of the minister to parlia-
ment can adequately check shortcomings and abuses in the admin-
istration of government departments. In practice, however, minis-
terial responsibility is one of the weaker conventions in the British
constitution.18 9 Ministers can only know a small portion of what
occurs within their departments. Moreover, they may feel con-
trolled by, rather than in control of, departmental policy.1 90 The
weakness of the convention mirrors the limited control that a min-
ister actually exercises over a department and suggests how tenu-
ous the relationship between parliament and specific government
action makes the concept of political legitimacy. The untenable as-
sumption that a minister has full detailed knowledge and control
of all the activities of his department was eventually recognized by
the Royal Commission on the Civil Service which recommended a
modification in the convention of civil servant anonymity.1 91
The ability of Parliament to exercise real control over minis-
ters or their departments is also questioned.192 The lack of time to
investigate, the limited parliamentary control over public expendi-
ture and the absence of any effective parliamentary sanction
against ministers illustrate problems of control.193 Ironically, the
rules of secrecy apply to the release of information to parliament
187. Tickner, supra note 6, at 588.
188. Wright, The Professional Conduct of Civil Servants, 51 PuB. An. 1, 4 (1973).
189. Gunn, supra note 179, at 254; Chapman, supra note 181, at 288.
190. See e.g., the statements of former Labour Minister Anthony Benn. Benn, Guard-
ian Agenda, The Guardian, Feb. 4, 1980, at 9, col. 1.
191. CxIi SERVICE REPORT, supra note 26, para. 283; The Royal Commission recognized
the difficulties in maintaining the appearance of impartiality but believed that modifications
in anonymity could be made while preserving the neutrality of the civil service. Id. para.
284.
192. OUTER CmcLE. POLICY GROUP, WHAT'S WRONG wrrH QUANGos? 28-32 (1979) (dis-
cusses the literature on ministerial responsibility).
193. Id.
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as well as to the public.194
The protection of whistleblowers in the United States federal
civil service contrasts sharply with the treatment of whistleblowing
in the British civil service. Before the British Civil Service can pro-
vide whistleblower protection, a substantial change in formal the-
ory and in attitude must occur.
b. Developing Justifications For Whistleblowing
Although the conventions of the British civil service do not
appear congenial to whistleblowing, several strains of thought sup-
port its legitimacy and rely on something in addition to the weak-
ness of the convention of ministerial responsibility. A subcom-
mittee of the First Division Association, representing the
administrative group of civil servants and senior legal officers,
troubled by the limited concern of the Royal Commission of the
Civil Service with ethics, issued a report addressing the question of
professional standards in the civil service.195 The Association rec-
ognized the multiple responsibilities of the civil servant and de-
tailed areas where civil service ethics provide inadequate guid-
ance. 196 Among these topics are four issues particularly related to
whistleblowing: (1) advocating ministerial points inadequately sup-
ported by facts or technical consideration, (2) preparing material
that may be regarded as misleading by a knowledgeable outsider,
(3) acting when the unorganized interests of the public are opposed
by highly organized special interest, and (4) determining how
much the public should be told.19 7 The Association took a wider
view of a civil servant's duty than the view supported by the tradi-
tional conventions of British public life. The Association examined
whether a civil servant had an independent duty to the public in-
terest or whether a civil servant's only duty was to the government
and whether that duty was fully discharged by loyal, truthful and
objective service to ministers. 98
Even arguments opposed to whistleblowing accept that a civil
194. 794 HANSARD'S PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES Jan. 20, 1970, col. 117. (written answer)
"The disclosure of official information without authority would naturally include such dis-
closure to a Member of Parliament." Id.
195. Professional Standards in the Public Service: A Report by the Committee of the
First Division Association, 50 PuB. AD. 167 (1972).
196. Id. at 170, 172.
197. Id. at 172.
198. Id. at 178, 175.
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servant has a duty to the law superior to that owed to a minister. 19
For example, in a Civil Service Department report regarding the
conduct of civil servants in unlawfully denying legal entitlements
to certain disabled war veterans,20 0 the Civil Service department
recognized that the civil servant's obligation to the law may re-
quire exposing unlawful acts; silence may be considered an implied
lie or misrepresentation by one who is aware of the true position.20 1
In discussing the potential criminal liability of the civil servant in-
volved, the report emphasized that the convention of ministerial
responsibility to parliament for the conduct of staff did not excuse
a civil servant who violated the criminal law.2 02 According to the
study, a civil servant was considered a part of a conspiracy to de-
fraud if he knowingly was a party to a decision to conceal informa-
tion or misrepresent the entitlements of a person.203
The law violated in this case is narrow, but the recognition of
standards beyond the civdl service rules provides a basis for
expanding the concept of an employee's duty to speak. The
First Division Association Subcommittee Report and the Civil Ser-
vice Department report suggest how ethical justification for
whistleblowing based upon duties owed outside the service, partic-
ularly those owed to law enacted by parliament, could be built in
the gaps left by the weakness of the convention of ministerial re-
sponsibility. The concept of duty based upon ethical responsibility
is important since acceptance of this concept in the United States
preceded legal recognition of whistleblowing and formal protection
of whistleblowers. Perhaps the most significant aspect of the
United States legislation is not the administrative protection it
provides but the recognition of the legitimacy .of whistleblowing.
Statutory recognition of whistleblowing could affect corruption
in the public service. First, since corruption is by its nature secret,
the encouragement of reporting by employees both within and
199. Wilding, supra note 65, at 182.
200. In the case examined, civil servants in a government department wrongfully with-
held a rank addition payment in disability pensions to certain groups of former regular
military officers. CIVIL SERVICE DEP'T, LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES:
A REPORT BY OFFICIALS para. 2 .(1979).
201. Id. para. 16 (ii). See also The Civil Service Department, Advice to Staff on Their
Position in Law, WHITLEY BULL., Feb. 1980, at 27. (If a civil servant had doubts concerning
the legality of a practice, he should consult his superior. If he believed the matter or order
involved dishonesty, he should take the matter to a higher level in the department).
202. CIVL SERVICE DEP'T, supra note 200, para. 18.
203. Id. para. 19. A more detailed analysis of the law of conspiracy upon which this and
other conclusions are based is found in id. app. 3, at 15.
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without government should increase the likelihood of discovery.
Second, because recognition of whistleblowing is likely to involve
acceptance of greater ethical responsibility by individual civil ser-
vants, conflict of interest regulations are likely to benefit from the
increased employee awareness. Third, whistleblowing, by reducing
the monolithic government control of information, may allay pub-
lic suspicion that the scope of corruption is broader than reported.
A discussion of whistleblowing exposes many of the conven-
tions of the British civil service and presents ethical dilemmas yet
unresolved by the traditional ethics of public service. The legiti-
macy of whistleblowing in the British civil service illuminates as-
pects of the service which are particularly important to an under-
standing of the implications of the use of legal control of public
service ethics in the United States. 204
2. Local Government
The employees of local authorities have unique opportunities
to discover information that suggests corruption or improper con-
duct on the part of officers or members of the authority. If the
information involves a senior officer or, more particularly, a mem-
ber of the council, an employee faces some difficulty and does not
go forward with suspicions without some risk. The power of a
council over employees, even chief officers, is substantial; officers
may be removed by the authority at will and while contractual re-
straints and the labor relations law provide some protection, the
power of an authority remains substantial.0 5
None of the chief executives interviewed by the author favored
a statutory provision requiring the consent of a relevant central
government official before a chief officer could be removed. Gener-
204. See discussion in text accompanying notes 219-41 infra.
205. At one time, for a hodgepodge of officials, the consent of the relevant secretary of
state in central government was required before a local authority could remove the officer.
C. ARNO & BAKER, THE LocAL GOVERNMENT ACr 1972, at 105-06 (1973) (applied to clerks of
county councils, treasurers of county councils, county medical officers of health, surveyors of
county councils; town clerks, treasurers, surveyors, medical officers and public health inspec-
tors in boroughs and districts; clerks and treasurers of parish councils; architects of the
London boroughs; clerks and treasurers of combined police authorities; and mental welfare
officers). The Local Government Act of 1972 § 112 removed this requirement.
Hinckley and Bosworth Borough Council v. Ainscough [1979] I.C.R. 590 (Employment
Appeals Tribunal) upheld the dismissal for redundancy of a chief executive after the council
had reorganized the authority's administration, abolishing the position of chief executive.
For a discussion of similar problems in public service in the United States, see R. VAUGHN,
supra note 139, ch. 4.
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ally, the issues raised included the effectiveness of the require-
ment, the concern for central government control and the belief
that a chief executive officer simply took these risks as part of his
job.
Although officers varied as to the amount of evidence neces-
sary to precipitate action, all the chief executives interviewed be-
lieved that if the chief executive officer were certain in his mind
that corrupt practices were involved he would contact the police.206
Most believed that a reasonable or credible suspicion would re-
quire discussion with the concerned member and most likely with
the party leader as well. One official stated that the officers of his
authority would contact the police only upon the receipt of a writ-
ten complaint.0 7
The relationship between a chief executive and a council is a
personal one. Once a chief executive loses the confidence of a coun-
cil and the ability to work with it, legal protections are of limited
usefulness. 208
Local government officers suffer not only from an absence of
statutory protection but also from the absence of a clearly defined
role. A clearly defined role provides protection and, more impor-
tantly, an ethical ground for whistleblowing. The strands of
thought in the civil service supporting whistleblowing rest heavily
on the specific role of the civil servant.
The Redcliffe-Maud Report outlines the characteristics of
councillors and employees which define the relationship between
them.209 The councillor is elected for a specific term while an em-
ployee does not have a stated period of employment. The council-
lor owes allegiance, in most instances, to a political party while the
employee's allegiance is to the authority. As the Report states, "A
sound relationship between them is vital to the successful running
of the authority. '210
206. Jackson-Hopkin Interview, supra note 22; Collins Interview, supra note 22; Wal-
ters-Davies Interview, supra note 22; Stanbury-Tawn Interview, supra note 22.
207. Taylor Interview, supra note 22.
208. THE REPORT OF THE BOGNOR REGIS INQUIRY, supra note 147, concerned the dismis-
sal of a clerk to a county (a chief legal and administrative officer) who claimed that the
action resulted from his assistance to the police in investigating corruption by members of
the council. The Report found that he had not been dismissed for this reason (Id. para. 273)
but that the events were based upon conflicts in personalities leading to an irreconcilable
breakdown of relations with the council. Id. para. 308.
209. REDCLiFFE-MAuD REPORT, supra note 4, para. 27.
210. Id.
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The relationship between elected councillors and employees
can complicate the employee's sense of loyalty. While the employee
sees his service to the authority as a whole, the employee also
works closely with the political leadership of the party in power.
The political conventions, however, that in practice protect the
neutrality of the civil servant and allow him to serve the public
while furthering the interest of the political party in power are not
as effective in local government because employees come into
much closer contact with members of the council than do civil
servants.1 1
The structure of local government and its traditions do not
favor development of cabinet government, and local government
employees remain where the conventions that protect the neutral-
ity of civil servants have not yet evolved. Exacerbating the tensions
produced in such circumstances is the increasing control of the au-
thority activities by the political leadership. Authority decisions
are made along party lines; often the party's caucus replaces the
council as the forum for decision. When a majority has been in
power for a considerable time, powerful political figures chair com-
mittees and tend to extend their concerns beyond the formulation
of policy to the review of implementation and then to involvement
in the administration of the authority. Development along these
lines would place administration not in the hands of local author-
ity officers but in the hands of a council member creating a type of
cabinet government.
Political neutrality is important to the fair and honest admin-
istration of the law.21 2 First, neutrality reduces potential ethical
conflicts of civil servants, by allowing them to serve the party in
power without sacrificing their obligations to the parliament. Sec-
ond, the conventions guarding political neutrality, merit selection
and service to either party also restrain the arbitrary or corrupt
exercise of power by elected officials. If an employee's appointment
and continuation rest on service to a political faction, loyalties are
likely to be to individual or to party rather than to the law. Ironi-
cally, the political neutrality that makes employees servants of the
211. Members of local councils freely seek information or advice from the head of a
local authority of subordinates in that department. A local government employee, particu-
larly an officer, does not serve the authority simply by rendering advice and assistance to
the political majority controlling the council, but rather serves everyone on the council.
Members of the majority and opposition sometimes seek advice and information from em-
ployees without consulting their superiors.
212. See generally R. VAUGHN, supra note 139, ch. 1.
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government gives them an independence that can act to check
corruption.
In the setting of local government, however, employees and
officers face ethical dilemmas and conflicts of loyalty which the
civil servant is spared. An officer's loyalty to the authority, to the
majority of the council and to all members of the council may not
always be reconcilable. Officers may also believe that their ultimate
obligation extends to the electorate, creating an additional
conflict.2 13
These conflicts are increased for most local government of-
ficers who are likely to be members of professional bodies. Histori-
cally, local government service has been divided by professional
function and affiliation to an extent not found in the civil
service.""
Professional ethics provide standards that cut across institu-
tions and allow professionals in local government to appeal to some
external criteria in evaluating and justifying their own conduct.
Such external standards reduce the monolithic control that most
institutions assert over their members and provide important
checks on official wrongdoing. Professional ethics, however, may be
abused to frustrate policies arrived at democratically. In addition,
professional ethics developed for a particular practice may be diffi-
cult to apply to employment situations outside of the profession.
Local government emerges as an area that lacks the clear
ethos prevailing in the civil service. Officers and employees neces-
sarily confront conflicting loyalties and, as a result, may lack the
guides that informal conventions and practices provide for the civil
service. New officers and employees are particularly likely to be
buffeted by conflicting demands until the lines of propriety become
213. This is the view of the clerk in the Bognor Regis inquiry, supra note 147. That
view was rejected by the inquiry. Id.
214. A solicitor is the secretary or chief legal officer; an accountant is the chief financial
officer; an engineer makes decisions dealing with engineering; a surveyor or planner is re-
sponsible for planning.
Even chief administrative officers have traditionally been solicitors or, recently, former
finance officers. Wilson, Who Would be a Chief Executive?, 53 PuB. AD. 231 (1975) (this
author also suggests career patterns can be changing with non-professionals of an adminis-
trative class becoming chief officers). A chief administrative officer does not practice his
profession as such but professional ethics apply to him in that capacity and he most likely
will retain the perspectives which the professional affiliation gave to him, as for example, a
chief executive officer who is by profession an accountant. Interview with J. E. Bell, supra
note 130. Added to this has been the growth of quasi-professional groups, such as social
workers, who seek professional identification.
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less clearly drawn and more difficult to discern.
Limited legal controls apply to the ethics of councillors. The
political nature of the controls suggests how much depends on the
personalities involved and on circumstances, and how pressures
can increasingly be brought to bear on the administration of local
government.
The relationship between members and officers must evolve in
a setting where many individuals have a great deal to gain from
impropriety. The unsettled conditions of local government ethics
help explain why conventional wisdom believes that corruption is
more likely to be a problem in local government than in the civil
service.
B. The United States Model
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 in the United States
protects the federal employee who discloses information which the
employee reasonably believes evidences the following: a violation
of law, rule, or regulation, mismanagement, a gross waste of funds,
an abuse of authority, or substantial and specific danger to the
public health or safety.215 The protection provided by the Act is
administrative. The Office of Special Counsel established as part of
the Merit Systems Protection Board receives complaints from
whistleblowers and if the Special Counsel finds the complaints
have merit, he/she may seek a stay of an agency action against the
whistleblower and ultimately reversal of the agency action.216 The
Special Counsel may also institute disciplinary action against
agency officials responsible for the harrassment of the
whistleblower. In addition, the Special Counsel may investigate a
charge regarding illegal or improper agency conduct and in certain
circumstances require the agency to investigate and respond to the
allegations.
Whistleblower protection in United States state and local gov-
ernment rests not upon statutory provision but upon the Constitu-
tion, primarily upon the First Amendment. The United States Su-
preme Court recognized that the First Amendment can protect
criticisms of a public employer including the release of information
by a public employee.217 Although problems of proof may be diffi-
215. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (Supp. III 1979).
216. 5 U.S.C. § 1206 (Supp. III 1979).
217. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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cult,2 1 state and local government employees in the United States
enjoy protections not available to the employees of local govern-
ment in Great Britain. The differences in protections for
whistleblowers in the United States and Britain illustrate how the
differences in United States and British government influence the
character of controls applied to the public service.
C. Conclusion
Arguably, the constitutional doctrine of the separation of pow-
ers reduces the potency of similar arguments against whistleblow-
ing. American civil servants can appeal not only to the letter of the
law, but to the obligation of another branch of government to
properly implement the law as well. Because of the executive's sep-
aration from the legislature, the argument that the political ac-
countability of the executive to the people establishes a bar to
whistleblowing carries less weight. Combined with a written consti-
tution of broad sweep, the doctrine of separation of powers denies
the federal executive the strength of argument available to the ex-
ecutive in Great Britain, which can more easily trace political ac-
countability and labors under less legislative restraint. In the
United States context, the political neutrality of civil servants sup-
ports rather than undermines the ethical bases of whistleblowing,
since neutrality may require that a civil servant's principal loyalty
be to the faithful execution of congressional policy. Thus, both in-
dependent political and ethical bases exist for whistleblowing.
As a practical matter, the separation of powers in the United
States guarantees greater congressional control of the executive.
This legislative control automatically undercuts the sole legitimacy
of the executive. A jealous Congress is more likely to impose statu-
tory controls on the civil service and to create obligations owed
directly or indirectly to Congress. Whistleblowing provides only
one example of the wide effects of the fundamental difference in
the organization of British and United States government. The
British parliamentary form of government generates stronger argu-
ments against whistleblowing and creates a context in which
whistleblowing is less likely to be accepted.
218. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 273 (1977). Problems of proof can
be difficult where plaintiff shows his conduct was within first amendment protection. Defen-
dant then has the burden to show the result would have been the same even without the
protection.
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III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE BRITISH
EXPERIENCE
Determining the implications of the British experience for the
United States involves risk. The usual dangers of comparative
analysis, such as failure to understand the context of the rules and
the acceptance of the United States model as the standard,2 19 are
increased in examining the British experience. The historic rela-
tionships between civil service reform in the two countries220 and
surface similarities in language and culture obscure real and im-
portant differences.
Law, ethical standards, codes and practices exist against an in-
stitutional and societal background that does much to determine
both the character and effectiveness of ethical controls. Despite the
importance of cultural, ethnic, economic, and ideological differ-
ences, however, comparison of ethical standards in different public
services is possible. The International Association of Schools and
Institutes of Administration sponsored conferences culminating in
an analysis of public service ethics that considered societal and in-
stitutional differences. 221 The problems outlined and the preven-
tive measures described would seem familiar to students of both
United States and British public service ethics.222
The differences of the British experience enable exploration of
issues that might be more difficult to examine solely on the experi-
ence of the United States. The most important of these is the role
of law, particularly legislation, in the regulation of public service
ethics. The British public service, which has traditionally been one
with limited statutory regulation with a reputation for integrity,
provides an excellent opportunity for examining how ethical rules
are established and enforced.
In both the United States and Great Britain, statutory control
is contrasted with informal controls, i.e., positive law versus ethical
restraints. In the United States, the executive director of the study
culminating in the 1962 verision of the federal conflict of interest
statutes, argued against increasing legal controls that could be
219. J. ScoTr, COMPARATIVE POLITICAL CORRUPTION 5 (1972); Williams, The Problem of
Corruption: A Conceptual and Comparative Analysis, PUB. AD. BULL. 41, 46, 52 (1976).
220. R. VAUGHN, supra note 139, §§ 1.2, 10.2.
221. DwIVEDI, PUBLIC SERVICE ETHICS 2-4 (International Institute of Administrative Sci-
ences 1978).
222. Id. at 10, 23-25 (Proposed Code of Conduct).
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costly and ineffective.22 .3 In Great Britain, one commentator has
called for greater statutory control of local government ethics224
while another has favorably contrasted the ethical restraints of the
civil service created by convention with a system of legal standards
applied through elaborate enforcement structures.225
Often commentators consider the law as only a set of statutory
prohibitions usually enforced through the criminal sanctions. The
British experience suggests that this view of the law is unnecessa-
rily narrow and limiting, and expressly raises the role of statutory
regulation of public service ethics.
The contrast between law and ethical restraint obscures many
of the issues that a system of ethical controls must address. The
conflicts are not between law and ethical restraint but involve
questions of the type of sanctions, standards, and enforcement
procedures to be used.
Ethical restraints can be restraints that are self-imposed with-
out external sanction or restraints that are developed and enforced
through some institutional mechanism not normally associated
with formal legal processes. Leaving aside for a moment the self-
imposed restraint, the British experience shows that no restraint is
imposed without sanctions.
Disciplinary sanctions, political sanctions, including the loss of
committee assignments or political influence, and informal sanc-
tions, including the loss of promotion opportunities or changed
working environment, are just as real economically and psychologi-
cally as sanctions prescribed by statute or by official regulation.
Acculturation or the development of the ethos within the British
public service relies upon the existence and use of sanctions to con-
form behavior and attitudes to the prevailing institutional norm.
Perhaps the best example of the necessity of sanctions to
maintain standards are the rules regarding the acceptance of busi-
ness appointments by retiring or resigning civil servants.22 6 The
usual informal institutional sanctions enforcing most of the ethical
rules and conventions do not apply effectively against one who has
left the service. At one time, the withholding of pension payments
enforced the rules but now no direct sanction is applied to the for-
223. See Manning, The Purity Potlatch: An Essay on Conflicts of Interest, American
Government, and Moral Escalation, 24 FaD. B.J. 239, 256 (1964).
224. Hare, supra note 14.
225. Wilding, supra note 65, at 185-86.
226. See text accompanying notes 50-119 supra.
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mer civil servant and only a tenuous sanction of questionable effec-
tiveness is applied to the outside employer.
The lack of a sanction can lead to the breakdown of the rule
itself. Although compliance with the standard may be substantial
without any sanction, conduct deviating from the rules that goes
unpunished will eventually raise questions regarding the standard
itself. To ensure continued voluntary compliance, modifications of
the rules to reduce the disadvantages of compliance must be en-
couraged. Since the parliamentary committee follows this analysis,
there are good reasons for focusing on this approach.
Viewed in this way, the choice is not one between statutory
control or ethical restraint but instead on the type of sanction that
is most appropriate. This view implicitly requires judgments re-
garding the character of the standards and the enforcement mech-
anism. Generally, in the British civil service, criminal and civil
sanctions are likely to be used to enforce relatively specific stan-
dards. These sanctions in turn rely upon enforcement mechanisms
external to the employing institution. By comparison, administra-
tive sanctions are likely to be used to enforce specified standards
and are enforced by the employing institution. Informal sanctions
enforce all these standards, including the more nebulous ones.
Argument concerning the appropriate sanctions must consider
a number of factors, including effectiveness and cost. Statutory
sanctions may vary in effectiveness depending upon the extent to
which the sanctions reinforce institutional practice and partly
upon the type of enforcement mechanisms established. Enforce-
ment mechanisms can be costly and formal procedures may impose
additional burdens on administrative efficiency.227 Additionally the
effect upon the recruitment of personnel can often be difficult to
determine.
Informal sanctions are likely to be effective and inexpensive
because they rely upon existing institutional structures and ar-
rangements. Informal sanctions, however, often apply arbitrary
and shifting standards and may encourage conduct substantially
different from that which the public would approve. 2 8 Because in-
227. The Expenditure Committee of the House of Commons noted that the constitu-
tional machinery surrounding the civil service that is designed to prevent corruption often
obstructs and reduces efficiency. The Committee, while recognizing that the record of the
civil service was good, questioned whether the costs outweighed the benefits. ELEvENTH RIE-
PORT, supra note 55, para. 125.
228. See generally P. BLAU, BuRlAucRAcY IN MODERN SocIETY 69 (1971).
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formal sanctions often apply standards developed by the institu-
tion, they have anti-democratic implications even when the stan-
dards enforced are ones which the public would approve.
The task confronting a legislative body seeking to regulate
conduct in the public service does not require a choice between
types of sanctions but rather, a determination of the proper rela-
tionship or mix of sanctions. To do this effectively, a legislative
body must understand the costs and advantages, and how formal
and informal sanctions and standards reinforce each other. Much
depends upon the setting in which the decision is made.
The British experience suggests that institutional and societal
settings can affect decisions regarding the appropriateness of
legislation and indicates some general principles applicable both to
Britain and to the United States. Some aspects of the British civil
service, such as its stability, have been examined but perhaps the
most important characteristic of the British civil service remains to
be discussed, the relative homogeneity of its upper level
administrators.
The higher civil service in Britain has long been an educated
elite heavily representing Oxford and Cambridge and sharing com-
mon views and perspectives. Many were trained in philosophy and
the humanities, seeing administration as an art that could be
applied to anything.2 29 Other classes within the civil service
"accepted their pre-eminence without question and followed their
example" partly because of the educational gulf between the
administrator and other groups within the civil service.2 30 Accord-
ingly the higher civil service set standards of great integrity.2 31
The Royal Commission on the Civil Service reporting in 1968
found that since World War II there had not been the broadening
of the social and educational base of the higher civil service that
might have been expected.23 The Royal Commission's Report rec-
ommended abolition of the administrative class, changes in grading
and recruitment and the greater use of professional and technical
personnel in administrative positions. 33
Changes were made in the administrative grades with greater
229. See A. SAMPSON, THE NEW ANATOMY OF BRITAIN 239-42 (1971); in fact, the bias in
favor of Oxford and Cambridge is greater than in 1950. P. SHERIFF, CAREER PATTERNS IN THE
HIGHER CIVIL SERVICE 13 (1976).
230. E. GLADDEN, supra note 6.
231. Id.
232. CIVIL SERVICE REPORT, supra note 26, para. 19.
233. Id. Summary of Main Findings at 104-06.
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opportunity for promotion from within. The extent or effect of the
changes remains in dispute.3 4 Undoubtedly pressure for changes
in the composition of the higher civil service will continue. One
commentator questions whether the change in recruitment from
classics and history to more technical disciplines will have a serious
impact upon the sense of values and code of behavior of the civil
235service.
The composition of the British civil service suggests some rea-
sons why informal controls have been effective in enforcing stan-
dards benefitting the public. The first of these is a sense of shared
value among the higher civil service and the influence of that
group in the civil service as whole. The second is an institutional
self-interest that encourages the development of standards prohib-
iting corrupt practices. In a stable civil service where employees
serve for long periods, the civil servant's view of himself will incor-
porate the values esteemed in society and in the higher civil
238
service.
The individual self-interest of officers in strong anti-corrup-
tion standards joins with a strong institutional interest of the indi-
vidual departments and of the civil service as a whole. The reputa-
tion for integrity affords the civil service substantial protection in
a period when it is subject to attack and criticism. A significant
scandal would seriously damage the ability of the civil service to
meet criticism in other areas.237
Changes in the composition of the civil service could reduce
the effective control of ethics within it. Additionally, these changes
could weaken the shared values that support and enforce the stan-
dards of probity. Such a change is occuring because the higher civil
service has become more representative of school populations and
234. For example, the Expenditure Committee of the House of Commons examined evi-
dence regarding continuing bias in the recruitment of administrative trainees, persons who
are promoted rapidly, ELzvENTH REPORT, supra note 55, para. 5. The bias favored Oxford
and Cambridge, at the expense of other universities, id. paras, 7-8; graduates of non-state
supported secondary schools, id. para. 9-10; and graduates with arts degrees, id. paras. 11-
12.
235. Chapman, Official Liberality, 20 PuB. AD. 123, 130.
236. Reputedly, some departments in the civil service, such as the Board of Inland Rev-
enue and the Ministry of Defense, more rigorously punish even minor breaches of the Code
of Conduct than some other departments. Employees in these departments accept this dif-
ferent treatment partly because it reinforces a favorable view of their employment and em-
phasizes the importance of integrity in those departments.
237. While this creates in the long term incentives to avoid corruption, it may create in
the short term incentives not to expose a substantial scandal.
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"one assumes of social class and composition."2 ss
Other changes suggest a possible weakening of the individual
and institutional attitudes regarding corruption and conflicts of in-
terest. A report by the National Whitley Council representing civil
service unions and management warned that "today the very much
larger number of executive officer entrants do not regard the Civil
Service or themselves as very special."239 Such a change could re-
duce some of the institutional support for strong ethical standards
by reducing the self-image of the individual civil servant that
uniquely defines his job in terms of the special integrity of the civil
service.
The open structure adopted after the Fulton Report to allow
advancement to the higher civil service of specialists may also af-
fect the attitudes of the civil service. Striking contrasts exist be-
tween the administrative groups and specialists in training, social
origin, educational background and career experience.24 0 Accord-
ingly, the influx of this group into the higher civil service may also
affect the consensus of values in the civil service.
Another change may reduce the ability of the civil service as
an institution to create a strong ethical imperative throughout the
civil service. The Report of the Whitley Council noted that be-
cause of the dispersal of civil service jobs throughout the country,
the civil service has become a regional and local service, particu-
larly at the lower grades.4 1 If so, local standards may increasingly
deviate from those established centrally.
Changes in the British civil service could lead to greater use of
statutory controls. If the loss of shared values influences legislative
action, the restatement of traditional standards might be more im-
portant than any new sanction applied. If the civil service accepts
the legitimacy of the statutory statement of standard, the addi-
tional statutory sanctions would not be of great importance. Under
these circumstances, the test would be whether the informal sanc-
tions of the civil service were imposed to enforce the statutory
standards.
Often the definition of standards through the legislative pro-
cess, representing a judgment of the public through its elected rep-
238. P. SHERnF, supra note 229, at 44.
239. Jonr STATEMENT BY THE NATIONAL WHITLEY COUNCI. AND FINAL REPORT BY THE
WIDER ISSUES REvIEw TERM, CIVIL SERVANTS AND CHANGE, para. 12 (1975).
240. P. SHEmnFF, supra note 229, at 45.
241. CIVIL SERVANTS AND CHANGE, supra note 239.
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resentatives, is successful not because of the statutory sanctions
but because of the ability to marshal institutional sanctions to en-
force the standards. Local government is an area where perhaps a
definition of ethical relationships could have such an effect.
If the range of institutional sanctions is not fully brought to
bear to support the statutory standard, the sanctions created by
the statute become much more important. The same result follows
if, for some reason, the informal sanctions are insufficient deter-
rents. Often a statute does not adopt a new standard but simply
makes a decision regarding the need for a different enforcement
mechanism and sanction.
The British experience suggests that statutory intervention is
most needed when institutional sanctions are least likely to sup-
port the desired standard. Intervention may be required in the
post-employment area where no institutional sanction can be ap-
plied easily. Other instances may arise when the standard itself is
likely to be opposed by institutional conventions. Whistleblowing
is such an area and the legislative statement of its legitimacy is
crucial. When institutional values are perceived as opposing a leg-
islatively desired standard, the importance of the legislatively es-
tablished enforcement mechanism increases. Acceptance of the le-
gitimacy of the legislatively articulated standard must, at some
point, take place if the informal sanctions are to be brought to
bear in support of the standard.
Legitimacy emphasizes that legislative action may sometimes
be taken simply so that a standard is promulgated through a dem-
ocratic procedure. Because institutional sanctions implicate self-es-
tablished standards, a legislative statement can be primarily a ges-
ture asserting control. Who makes the decision and how it is made
can be as important as the decision itself.
As institutional arrangements within the civil service affect
the choice of sanctions, the legislative decision establishing ethical
standards or new sanctions affects the existing arrangements. The
situation is not static but is influenced by legislative decisions as
well.
Legislative enactments can affect institutional arrangements
and attitudes in a number of ways. First, a legislative enactment
can reinforce existing standards. Simply restating an administra-
tive standard can reinforce and legitimize the standard. Moreover,
an existing standard can be reinforced by creating new sanctions or
by altering the enforcement mechanisms to increase its deterrent
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effect.
Second, the legislation can create new perceptions. While
there are limits to the ability of legislation to change attitudes or
to apply standards effectively, legislation can be a powerful
teacher. Legislation can be particularly effective in bringing distant
loyalties and obligations to bear. Through daily contact, public em-
ployees learn their obligations to supervisors, to their departments,
and to their public employer. Obligations to the public, to the ex-
tent that they are not included in these other obligations, remain
distant and ill-defined. The further from the employee and the
more abstract an obligation, the less likely it impresses the em-
ployee. Legislation can affect the climate of public service by pro-
viding that distant obligations be defined and brought to bear
upon public employees. The structure of British local government
suggests that legislation may be important in increasing local gov-
ernment employees' perceptions of their obligations.
Third, legislation can do more than prohibit; it can provide
incentives for ethical conduct. An obvious incentive is adequate
pay for public employees. Less obvious, but equally important, are
structural changes that support and encourage ethical conduct
within civil service institutions. Training programs and central
consideration of a department's obligations to encourage ethical
conduct are examples of ethical incentive programs. Additionally,
procedures for making and evaluating decisions, such as the grant-
ing of contracts, can provide increased incentives for ethical
conduct.
Normally, with public service ethics, concerns about the limits
of law are concerns about the effectiveness of legislation against
the context of a particular institutional setting. Legislative sanc-
tions are limited and cannot alone create or guarantee ethical con-
duct. Usually, the greater the reliance upon legislative sanctions,
formal procedure, specific standards, and external enforcement,
the greater the costs of enforcement. Recognition of these limits,
however, does not exclude legislation from an important role in
public service ethics.
Does anything remain of ethical self-restraint unconnected to
the availability of sanction? The basis for ethics raises philosophi-
cal questions that have troubled us as long as the questions have
been asked. In a more limited sense, ethical standards require self-
restraint since no scheme of enforcement could prevent abuse or
perserve standards without such restraint. Calls for education and
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training are not simply admissions of the futility of control or glib
responses to difficult problems but a recognition of the importance
and necessity of self-restraint in any system of legal control. At its
best, legislation as an influence and guide teaches self-restraint.
The British system of controls assumes much more self-re-
straint than that in the United States and, as a result, appears al-
most naive in some of its enforcement procedures. The unanswered
question is whether the circumstances exist that allow for such an
assumption, i.e., whether self-control will generate restraint and
responsibility rather than encourage evasion. A system, which in-
cludes risks of evasion, may in fact improve ethics if there is a
reasonable assurance that most employees will perceive this pre-
caution as an act of trust, thereby encouraging a sense of personal
restraint.
The British experience forces examination of a system with a
much different mix of sanctions and confronts us with some of the
most difficult questions underlying control of public service ethics;
questions that cannot be answered by contrasting ethics and law.
We are remarkably ignorant of the effect of sanctions and under-
stand even less about the relationship between the different types
of sanctions operating differently under different standards.242 In
the United States federal civil service, we have significant new leg-
islation affecting public service ethics. The British experience indi-
cates that in evaluating this legislation and in determining our
next steps, closer analysis of the particular problems and of the
circumstances in which they are to be resolved is required. The
British experience implies the advantage of greater dialogue in the
United States between academic disciplines in examining public
service ethics. Specifically, it implies a melding of the perceptions
of law and administration.
242. Studies recognize the difficulty of predicting the effect of particular sanctions and
differ on the effects of legal sanction. See Schwartz & Orleans, On Legal Sanctions, 34 U.
CH. L. REV. 274 (1967); Becker, Crime and Punishment! An Economic Approach, 76 J.
POL. ECON. 169 (1968). See also C. THoMAs & J. WILLIAMS, THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF SANC-
TIONS: A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY (1974).
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